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Introduction 
 Many Americans remember the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill as one of the most 
damaging technological disasters in American history and, until the Deepwater Horizon spill 
of 2010, it was the largest that the United States had ever experienced.1 The country had 
never seen a spill of this magnitude in its own waters. When the Exxon Valdez tanker ran 
aground on Bligh Reef on March 24, 1989, 11 million gallons of crude oil flooded into the 
Prince William Sound and coated over one thousand miles of isolated Alaskan shoreline.2 
Almost immediately, the spill threatened the special relationship between the people of 
Alaska and the fragile ecosystem. The U.S. government and Exxon’s subsequent response to 
the disaster endangered the political, social, and economic cohesion of both native and non-
native communities. Before the disaster, emergency planners doubted the possibility of a spill 
of such magnitude, which meant that responders were unprepared to fight the spill.3 As a 
result, poorly planned response and recovery efforts damaged the infrastructure, economies, 
and social cohesion of small Alaskan Native and non-native towns, with long-lasting 
consequences. The response became a disaster in its own right.   
 The Prince William Sound sits on Alaska’s southeastern coast, one part of the Gulf of 
Alaska.4 In the northernmost portion of the sound, the port of Valdez houses the Valdez 
Marine Terminal, the southern end of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. The Exxon 
1 A technological disaster is defined by the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council as “a 
catastrophic event caused by humans that results in the toxic contamination of the environment.” This definition 
sets it apart from other environmental disasters by highlighting the human element in the disaster. Throughout 
this paper, the terms “technological disaster” and “man-made disaster” will be used interchangeably.  
2 Environmental Protection Agency, “Exxon Valdez Spill Profile,” accessed February 20, 2014, 
http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/exxon-valdez-spill-profile. 
3 John Keeble, Out of the Channel (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 21. 
4 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, “Index of Prince William Sound Potential Places of 
Refuge Maps 1 through 16,” updated March 2005, 
http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/pwspor/pwspporindexmap.pdf. 
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Valdez’s ill-fated journey began here on the morning of March 24. Dozens of towns and 
villages spot the coastline around the sound. The residents of these towns, both settler non-
native Alaskans and Alaskan Natives, will be the primary focus of this discussion. 
Throughout, I will refer to the area collectively as the “Prince William Sound region,” while 
focusing on the Alaskan Native communities of Chenega Bay, Tatitlek, Port Graham, 
Akhiok, and English Bay and the non-native communities of Valdez, Cordova, Whittier, 
Homer, Seward, and Kodiak. All of these cities and villages are located within 500 miles of 
Valdez, while the spill itself traveled about 1,300 miles from Bligh Reef.5 
 During the 1980s and the 1990s, the United States was emerging from a Cold War era 
of technological development and refocusing on the environmentalist movement began in the 
1960s. American popular opinion shifted to focus on whose responsibility it was to protect 
the environment. The continuance of large grassroots movements and a greater awareness of 
the finite nature of natural resources aided what has been called the “institutionalized 
environmental movement.” 6 Government officials gradually became more involved in 
environmental agencies and research while the mass media redefined itself as an agent of 
emotional leverage for the environmental cause. By the time that the Exxon Valdez, and her 
captain Joseph Hazelwood, cruised by Bligh Reef in March 1989, the American people were 
already familiar with Chernobyl, the harvesting of rainforests, and various other chemical 
spills.7 These events familiarized the public with manmade disasters that occurred with 
5 Carrie Holba, “Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: FAQs, Links and Unique Resources at ARLIS,” Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services, June 2010, http://www.arlis.org/docs/vold2/a/EVOS_FAQs.pdf. 
6Riley Dunlap and Angela Mertig, American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental Movement, 1970-1990 
(Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Francis, 1992), 107. 
7 Ibid. 
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greater frequency.  This human element of the technological disaster meant that someone was 
responsible for the mess. 
 The nature of the disaster distinguished the Exxon Valdez spill from anything that 
had yet happened in American history. It was the largest man-made disaster that responders 
had ever encountered. Natural disasters, like tornadoes or hurricanes, are devastating, but 
familiar. Natural disasters have no direct human cause, and it is difficult to find someone to 
blame. Nature, as Lars Weisaeth put it, has no “evil intent.”8  A technological disaster, by 
definition as a man-made disaster, is different because the perceived cause is different. 
Because technological disasters result directly, or indirectly, from human action, they elicit 
more violent responses from victims and carry a different emotional weight than natural 
disasters.9 In the wake of technological disasters, victims can blame greedy corporations or 
aggressive governments, focusing their pain and frustration. 
 Those who responded to the spill therefore needed to strike a balance between 
compassion and action. The scope of the disaster required an extensive and thorough 
response. But because the community was emotionally volatile, tact and regular training were 
also essential. The spill also exacerbated problems already present in the Alaskan 
communities. Many of these problems were the result of underdevelopment and chronic 
unemployment.10 On a large scale, the spill and the response targeted these fundamental 
weaknesses and did not facilitate recovery.  
8 Lars Weisaeth, “Psychological and psychiatric aspects of technological disasters,” in Individual and 
Community Response to Trauma and Disaster: The Structure of Human Chaos, ed. R. Ursano, B. McCaughey, 
& C. Fullerton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 75. 
9 Lewis Aptekar, The Psychological Process of Adjusting to Natural Disaster (Boulder, CO: San Jose State 
University, 1993), 9.  
10 Joanna Endter-Wada, Jon Hofmeister, Rachel Mason, Steven McNabb, Eric Morrison, Stephanie Reynolds, 
Edward Robbins, Lynn Robbins, and Curtiss Rooks, Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages, IV. 
                                                 
  5 
The added struggle was that the spill, as a disaster, was ongoing. There was a clear 
beginning, but no apparent end to the damage.11 There was no clear distinction between 
response and recovery. In most disaster, a transition exists. Agencies take certain actions 
during the response phase, and different actions during the recovery. For the oil spill, 
however, this delineation was not apparent. Response activities bombarded the communities, 
repeatedly affecting the pre-existent weaknesses in the communities. 
 Traditional discussion of the spill ignored these weaknesses, which are by their very 
nature more difficult to identify. The current literature about the spill focuses on its 
environmental and biological effects and the legal consequences of subsequent trials.12 
Documentaries and government reports have examined these questions in detail, but scholars 
have ignored the social implications of the response and the negative consequences of the 
failure to plan for post-spill recovery.  
 This study draws heavily on pre- and post-spill social and psychological studies of the 
Prince William Sound region and oral histories.13 There are countless studies on the social 
and psychological aspects of the spill conducted from a social science perspective, with Dr. J. 
Steven Picou leading in his field as a specialist in emotional and psychological response to 
technological disasters.14  Little has been written, however, analyzing what the effects of the 
Postspill Key Informant Summaries, U.S. Department of the Interior: Minerals Management Service (New 
Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1993). 
11 Thea Levkovitz, ed. The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens Commission 
Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Anchorage, AK: The National Wildlife Federation, 1990) 
12 Alaska Resources Library & Information Services, “Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Resources for Teachers and 
Students,” updated March, 2009, 
http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/EVOS_resources_march_1990.pdf. 
13 Sharon Bushell and Stan Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster (Seattle, WA: 
Epicenter Press, 2009). 
14 Duane A. Gill, J. Steven Picou, and Liesel A. Ritchie, “The Exxon Valdez and BP Oil Spills: A Comparison 
of Initial Social and Psychological Impacts,” American Behavioral Scientist 2011: 1-21, accessed February 20, 
2014, http://abs.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/08/05/0002764211408585.full.pdf. 
                                                 
  6 
spill mean in the broader context of disasters as a recurring part of our nation’s history. 
Books on the history of Alaska usually address the spill. Some authors have focused on the 
spill as the spill itself, not dedicating more than a few pages to the negative consequences of 
the responders, as separate from the oil itself.15 These ideas are rarely brought together. 
 During the response and recovery phases of the spill, the government and oil 
companies’ narrow understanding of their response goals created problems within the local 
communities surrounding the Prince William Sound. They ignored areas that needed 
attention but did not fit the traditional definition of damage. The sudden arrival of cleanup 
workers, response agencies, and media representatives overwhelmed local infrastructure. The 
flood of money changed the local economy and created a new understanding of job security. 
Meanwhile, longstanding socio-political tensions in local communities influenced the 
situation. There were also negative changes in non-Native social make-up and concurrent 
disruptions and cultural shifts for the Alaskan Native communities. 
This thesis argues that planning failures and cultural insensitivity on the part of 
Exxon and other responding agencies during the response to and recovery from the Exxon 
Valdez spill resulted in damages to local infrastructure, economies, and social unity. These 
damages emerged independent of problems caused by the oil itself. A successful recovery 
from a disaster means that “individuals and families…to rebound from their losses, and 
sustain their physical, social, economic” and spiritual “well-being.”16 But at the time of the 
15 Walter Borneman, Saga of a Bold Land (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); Bob Reiss, The Eskimo and the 
Oil Man: The Battle at the Top of the World for America’s Future (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 
2012); Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims (Don Mills, ON: 
Fitzhenry & Whiteside Limited, 1975); Stephen Haycox, Frigid Embrace: Politics, Economics, and 
Environment in Alaska (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2002); Art Davidson, In the Wake of the 
Exxon Valdez (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1990). 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Disaster Recovery Framework, Draft (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 2010), 2. 
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Exxon Valdez spill, recovery efforts focused solely on the physical well-being of the water 
and the environment. They did not address the spill’s social and economic consequences. Nor 
did they address the dislocation that recovery efforts caused. By looking at this dislocation, 
we can identify steps that should be taken to ensure that if (or when) another technological 
disaster occurs in an isolated area, the failures that created damages in the communities 
around the Prince William Sound in 1989 will not be repeated.  
The first chapter demonstrates that the inherent fragility of the communities of the 
Prince William Sound, which resulted from their geographic isolation, high unemployment, 
and low-cash economy, exacerbated by ethnic and political tension made them especially 
vulnerable to a disaster. Poor planning physically damaged local communities in three ways, 
as chapter two argues. The influx of people strained the local infrastructure. The inflow of 
large quantities of cash changed residents’ perceptions of money and work. Planning efforts 
failed to foster an environment conducive to long-term economic recovery. Finally, chapter 
three contends that, alongside this material dislocation, non-native towns and Alaskan Native 
villages alike suffered social disruption and cultural damage. In non-native communities, 
crime and unemployment rose, with serious social consequences. Alaskan Native 
communities, additionally, experienced a cultural shift. Interactions with responders during 
the spill resulted in changes in their perception of themselves and their relation to the land. 
 The responders’ failures to foresee the negative consequences of their efforts offer 
lessons on how to improve current disaster management practices. At every stage, it is 
essential for responders to examine the spill from the perspective of those experienced it. 
Focusing on professional titles, legal requirements, and basic planning can blur the human 
dimension of any disaster. We should examine the Exxon Valdez spill and other similar 
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events holistically, much in the same way that we study war and its consequences. The 
essential elements of any disaster will be the people affected by it and the people responding 
to it. All involved come to the scene with their own histories, cultural assumptions, and roles 
in the disaster and recovery. The response to and recovery from the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
failed to remember this essential fact. And because oil spills and other technological disasters 
will continue to be a part of the modern American story, we must figure out where response 
and recovery planners went wrong in 1989.  
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Chapter 1: Shaped by Oil 
 In order to grasp the extent to which the communities of Prince William Sound would 
were affected by the responders to the wreck of the Exxon Valdez, it is important to know 
what life was like before the spill. A basic understanding of the people and their way of life 
helps to explain why they reacted the way that they did. By taking this situation into account, 
responders could have mitigated the negative consequences of the response. Before the spill, 
Prince William Sound had already survived numerous tragedies, losing buildings to 
earthquakes and land to oil companies. The nature and history of the sound influenced the 
stability of the area at the time of the spill. It guided the way in which citizens and responders 
reacted and affected the make-up of the response itself and defining what recovery would 
mean for those involved. 
The communities surrounding the Prince William Sound in Alaska have been shaped 
by a history of racial tension and rigid interactions with oil companies. The region is isolated 
and fragile. Conversations about development and bids for land and oil are familiar to 
residents. Their experiences and rocky history are evident in the lack of stability in the social 
and economic environment of the region. These instabilities evolved as the result of the 
region’s fluctuating and seasonal economy and their experiences with past development.  
The region’s history influenced their reactions to the Exxon Valdez spill. The region 
was defined by the interaction of Alaskan Native and non-native cultures. Cultural tensions 
were exacerbated by increasing discussions over oil and the building of the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline. During the response and recovery to the spill, effects of planning failures were 
intensified by these pre-existent vulnerabilities.  
  10 
 
The Prince William Sound: An Introduction 
The Prince William Sound is large, twice the size of the state of Massachusetts and 
about the full size of Switzerland.17 Around it sit several towns and villages, including 
Valdez, which in the late 1970s became home to the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company’s 
multi-million dollar oil terminal.18 By 1989, the area boasted a population of between five 
and six thousand people, including one thousand Alaskan Natives.19 This population is 
isolated. Many of these towns had little or no access to the rest of the state, the result of poor 
or nonexistent roads and few airports.  
 Some of these towns are exclusively Alaskan Native in population. Based on the 1971 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, a native village is “any tribe, band, clan, group, 
village, community, or association in Alaska” recognized or eligible to be recognized by the 
settlement.20 This settlement created townships for eligible Alaskan Native tribes and groups 
and separated the villages from other state-owned property. Additionally, the act gave native 
communities the theoretical right to govern themselves and to operate apart from public 
townships like Valdez or Seward. The act also divided Alaska into “regional corporations” 
based on location.21 These corporations operated like businesses and consisted of 
shareholders. These shareholders were the designated Alaskan Natives who were part of the 
17 Paul Whitfield, The Rough Guide to Alaska (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 285. 
18 John Keeble, Out of the Channel, 16. 
19 United States Coast Guard: Department of Transportation, Federal on Scene Coordinator’s Report: T/V 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office), 11. 
20 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1601–1629e (1994)). 
21 Ibid. 
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native communities at the passage of the act and were eligible to receive benefits and make 
decisions regarding regional governance.  
 Because of different governing systems and cultures, Alaskan Native villages around 
the sound developed different economic structures from the surrounding non-native towns. 
Thanks to the sound’s abundance of natural resources, Alaskan Natives practiced a 
subsistence-based lifestyle with deep historical roots in Alaskan Native heritage.22 This 
meant that instead of operating large businesses or regularly participating in national or 
international trade, native villagers relied on hunting and gathering for their basic needs. 
Cash supplemented these practices through the purchase of luxury items or improved 
weapons for hunting.23 
 By contrast, the economies of the non-native communities relied on the boom-and-
bust cycles of major industries.24  In the mid-eighteenth century, the fur trade defined the 
colonial Alaskan economy.25 Mining and the gold rush followed, until fishing and canning 
rose to dominate the Alaskan economy.26  Before 1989, Western Alaska canneries processed 
over a quarter of the total Alaskan salmon harvest. The city of Kodiak boasted one of the 
state’s largest fishing fleets.27 However, the development of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
profoundly changed in familiar way of life. Oil became king.  
22 Charles M. Mobley et al. The 1989 Exxon Valdez Cultural Resource Program (Anchorage: Exxon Shipping 
Company, 1989), 55.  
23 J. Steven Picou, “The Day the Water Died: Cultural Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” in The Exxon 
Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou, Duane A. Gill, and Maurie J. Cohen 
(Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1999), 169. 
24 Borneman, Alaska: Saga of a Bold Land, 522. 
25 Mobley et al., The 1989 Exxon Valdez Cultural Resource Program, 52. 
26 Terrence Cole, “Golden Years: The Decline of Gold Mining in Alaska,” in Pacific Northwest Quarterly: 62-
71, 62. 
27 United States Coast Guard: Department of Transportation, Federal on Scene Coordinator’s Report: T/V 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 11. 
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Alaska and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Setting the Social Stage 
 The Prince William Sound was, like most rural communities, socially and 
economically unsound. Its communities relied on fragile industries and struggled with racial 
tensions between Alaskan Natives and settler Alaskans.28  The building of the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline exacerbated these racial tensions and chronic problems of unemployment in the 
area. As a result, the local community was susceptible to internal conflict and vulnerable to 
economic fluctuations.  
 The building of the pipeline exacerbated tensions between Alaskan Natives and 
settler Alaskans. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, passed in 1973, gave oil 
companies permission to build in the previously off-limits regions the state.29 Some 
communities embraced the pipeline. They welcomed the jobs and increased business that the 
construction brought.30 For non-native Alaskans, development provided an opportunity for 
increased business profits and improved living standards. 
That was not the only side of the story, however. As companies moved into 
traditionally native lands, preexistent tensions over land claims and land ownership 
increased. One witness at a Congressional committee hearing in 1946 declared, “The Indians, 
with their aboriginal rights, are a federal problem. We have no control and we cannot dispose 
of it and we have nothing to say about it.”31 The Alaskan Native’s views on oil and land 
rights were different from those of non-native Alaskans. They traditionally relied on the land 
28 Alaska Advisory Committee, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racism’s Frontier: The Untold Story of 
Discrimination and Division in Alaska, by Gilbert F. Gutierrez, Daniel Alex, et al. (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 2002), 1. 
29 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Title 42, U.S. Code, Sec. 1651. Available: http://www.justice.gov; 
accessed 23 November, 2013. 
30 Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims, 117. 
31 Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims, 25. 
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for survival and experienced it as part of their culture. They understood development on 
native lands as a personal, not an economic, issue. 
 These tensions resulted in part from inherent cultural differences regarding land and 
its meaning. Alaskan Natives were accustomed to a specific lifestyle that focused on using 
the land for food. Non-natives, on the other hand, regularly visited grocery stores and ate 
mass-produced food. The disagreements that emerged over land ownership during 
discussions over Alaskan statehood in the 1950s contributed to the atmosphere of racial 
tensions and cultural misunderstandings.32 Once Alaska set aside land for native 
communities during the 1970s, interactions between native and non-native community 
leaders became tense. An Alaskan Native resident from Chenega Bay later described 
interacting with Exxon and other responders to the Exxon Valdez oil spill as frustrating for 
everyone because “they [Exxon] just really didn’t understand Alaska, and…they certainly 
couldn’t understand village life, or Native subsistence life.”33 By the time of the spill, 
therefore, racial tensions were already deeply embedded in Southwestern Alaska society. 
This created a volatile atmosphere that responders to the Exxon spill would later have to 
navigate.34 
 Adding to the socio-cultural tensions underlying domestic politics, the Alaskan 
frontier also struggled with chronic unemployment. The seasonal unemployment associated 
with fishing and tourism, coupled with the number of workers coming to the state during the 
summer, ensured that Alaska claimed one of the nation’s highest rates of unemployment 
32 Alaska Advisory Committee, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racism’s Frontier: The Untold Story of 
Discrimination and Division in Alaska, 3. 
33 Sharon Bushell and Stan Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 251. 
34 Alaska Advisory Committee, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racism’s Frontier: The Untold Story of 
Discrimination and Division in Alaska, 
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during the late twentieth century.35 The rise and fall of Alaskan employment rates came as 
the result of what scholar Mary Berry describes as the presence of “transients.”36 These 
people went temporarily to Alaska to work seasonal jobs, but left once work ran out. The 
influx of people, all at once, competing for the same jobs meant that some people could not 
find work. Those who could leave did. But those who could not remained in the area, adding 
to Alaska’s unemployment rate. This was normal for many of the communities of Alaska. 
Additionally, the traditional lifestyle of the native communities saw many people regularly 
unemployed.                                                             
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline worsened these problems. The Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Company was incorporated in 1970 to build a pipeline that transferred oil from the interior 
parts of Alaska to the coast, where it could be loaded onto tankers and sent to refineries.37 
Construction began in the spring of 1974 and was completed in the early summer of 1977. 
Economists who wanted to understand the effects that building the pipeline would have on 
the local economies believed that after the pipeline’s completion, unemployment levels 
would return once temporary jobs ran out.38 They suggested that the increase in jobs, and 
people, would have adverse effects on unemployment in the long run.  
That was exactly what happened. Unemployment rates in the state dropped sharply in 
1974 before rebounding in 1978 to slightly above pre-pipeline levels.39 Into the 1980s, 
unemployment rates continued to rise, damaging the overall stability of the economy. With 
35 Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims, 231. 
36 Ibid. 230  
37 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co, Pipeline History, 2013, accessed November 15, 2013,  
http://www.alyeskapipe.com/TAPS/HistoryDesignConstruction. 
38Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land, 233. 
39William Carrington, “The Alaska Labor Market during the Pipeline Era,” in Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 104, No. 1, 186-218, 202. 
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the temporary drop in unemployment, an estimated 70,000 people participated in the 
construction of the pipeline.40 As the endpoint of the 800 mile pipeline, Valdez experienced a 
traumatizing influx of workers and their families.41 Housing and supplies for basic living 
were limited.  
The transformation of Valdez was exacerbated by the fact that the small town was 
still trying to recover from the 1964 earthquake that had nearly decimated the town.42 
Alyeska moved in to capitalize on the rising prices of oil in America while Valdez and the 
other towns surrounding the Prince William Sound were struggling to rebuild. With the 
earthquake’s epicenter located in the Prince William Sound, Valdez was all but destroyed.43 
Residents eventually rebuilt the town further inland with the help of the Army Corps of 
Engineers. The work took four years, resettling a total of about sixty-two homes.44  
 Bringing in extra workers to build the pipeline was going to be challenge for such a 
small community. Alyeska tried to mitigate the problem by constructing a work camp that 
housed house 3,500 of their men.45 But, in her account of the construction of the pipeline, 
Mary Berry described a scene where “people were camping wherever they could” and “the 
residents…were worrying about crime.”46 The oil companies worried more about getting the 
40 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co, Pipeline History, 2013, accessed November 15, 2013,  
http://www.alyeskapipe.com/TAPS/HistoryDesignConstruction. 
41 Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land, 280. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Borneman, Alaska: Saga of a Bold Land, 434. 
44 “Valdez History-1964 Good Friday Earthquake,” Valdez Convention & Visitors Bureau, accessed 23 
November, 2013, http://www.valdezalaska.org/discover-valdez-history/valdez-history-1964-good-friday-
earthquake. 
45 Mary Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims, 280. 
46 Ibid. 
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pipeline up and running than about the people whose lives they were disrupting. This 
disruption did not end with the completion of the pipeline.  
Evidently Leaking Some Oil 
 On the evening of March 23, 1989, the people of the Prince William Sound settled in 
for a quiet Good Friday. The memory of the 1964 earthquake lingered as everyone prepared 
for the Easter weekend, including Captain Joseph Hazelwood, who had gone ashore to send 
Easter flowers to his family.47 Coast Guard officer Mark Delozier described it as a “crisp, 
cold, very clear night,” a perfect night for getting underway.48  Fog, snow, and ice on the 
water required ship captains to pay close attention when moving through the channel.  
Everyone was prepared for the routine. Radar man Gordon Taylor, a civilian working 
for the United States Coast Guard, had arrived at work at the Coast Guard station Valdez that 
evening, just as he had many others. Steve McCall, the commanding officer of the Marine 
Safety Office at Valdez, and his executive officer, Tom Falkenstein, were at home with their 
families while Bruce Blanford was getting ready for his shift when he would relieve Taylor 
at midnight. He planned to arrive twenty minutes before midnight to keep an eye on the 
vessels moving in an out of the area known as “the Narrows.”49 Meanwhile, a blip had been 
moving in and out of Taylor’s radar screen all night. That blip was the Exxon Valdez, under 
Captain Hazelwood’s command, and it was about to cause trouble. 
 At 12:26 AM, March 24, Hazelwood hailed the Coast Guard’s Vessel Traffic 
Services center.50 He had started following a tug out of the channel less than three and half 
47 Sharon Bushell and Stan Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 26. 
48 Ibid., 28. 
49 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 13. 
50 Keeble, Out of the Channel, 43. 
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hours before. The captain himself spent most of that time below deck doing paperwork, 
leaving an inexperienced helmsman Robert Kagan to steer the vessel.51  At the Vessel Traffic 
Center, Hazelwood’s voice sounded like a garbled mess. His raspy voice announced that the 
Valdez had “fetched up” near Bligh Reef.52 He sounded almost bored as he told Traffic 
Valdez “evidently we’re leaking some oil.”53 Hazelwood stumbled over his words, 
seemingly unaware of the damage he had caused. The Valdez had hit Bligh Reef shortly after 
midnight, following a flurry of confused piloting commands.54 
 Coast Guard Commander Steven McCall arrived on the scene quickly, woken by a 
frantic call from the Coast Guard Officer of the Deck at the Valdez station. McCall was 
shocked. No one expected a wreck on the reef. McCall had gone to school with Hazelwood, 
and trusted him, as did most of the maritime community, despite Hazelwood’s repeated 
drinking infractions.55 So, understandably, when McCall phoned Hazelwood on board and 
the all on board had different stories and inconsistent information, he was frustrated. First, 
McCall needed information on the ship’s stability. Could Hazelwood move it? Would 
moving it cause further damage? Hazelwood did not know.56 Then there was the ebbing tide. 
Would it cause the ship to split in half? Making matters worse, McCall knew that the ship 
was leaking oil, but he did not know how much. When he sent executive officer Lieutenant 
Thomas Falkenstein and Chief Warrant Officer Mark Delozier out to the ship, no one knew 
what to expect.  
51Ibid., 41. 
52 “The First Call,” The Whole Truth Campaign, 2008, accessed September 29, 2013, 
http://www.wholetruth.net/history.htm 
53 “The First Call,” 2013. 
54 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 18. 
55 Ibid., 19. 
56Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 48. 
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 The pilot ship carrying Falkenstein, Delozier, and a small crew left for Bligh Reef at 
12:45 AM.57 The smell of raw oil was overwhelming from within a mile of the Valdez. Thick 
black rivers spewed from the slashed orange hull, masking the starboard side.58 For hours, 
the oil flowed, rising several feet above the once clear waters of the Prince William Sound. 
Approaching the vessel, the pilot ship drove through thick pools of the sickly sweet oil that 
poured from underneath the Valdez. According to the national response team report, by 
5:00AM, 10.1 million gallons of oil had spilled into the sound.59  
 When the Coast Guard crew found him, Hazelwood stood in the wheelhouse, up on 
the bridge of the ship.60 He was drinking coffee and smoking, resigned to the fact that there 
was little else he could do, especially after trying to force the vessel off the reef, a fact that 
was later contested in court.61 Reporters interpreted Hazelwood’s lack of interest as a sign of 
panic. He did not know much about the incident. When those who arrived later on the scene 
asked about the nature of the problem, Hazelwood answered, “You’re looking at it.”62 
 Alyeska officials reacted in a variety of ways. Chuck O’Donnell, the Alyeska 
Corporation’s top executive, received a call informing him of the spill at 12:30AM. He called 
an aide to investigate and went back to sleep.63 The aide, Larry Shier, assured the Coast 
Guard and representatives of Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation that the 
company had already begun implementing its oil spill contingency plan. Then he, too, went 
57 Ibid., 28. 
58 Keeble, Out of the Channel, 42. 
59 Department of Transportation and Environmental Protection Agency, National Response Team, The Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President, by Samuel K. Skinner and William K. Reilly (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. United States Government Printing Office, 1989). 
60 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 29. 
61 Keeble, Out of the Channel, 43. 
62Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 22. 
63 Keeble, Out of the Channel, 44. 
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back to sleep.64 The Coast Guard believed that Alyeska was already responding. An official 
report later states that “within the first hour Alyeska was rousing its workforce, and 
organizing its response.”65 This was not, in fact, the case. By 4:00AM, there was still no sign 
of an Alyeska response vessel. When workers finally arrived at the terminal an hour later, 
they did not have the equipment or resources necessary to act. 
“They Were Mucking Up the Works:” The Response 
 From the beginning, the initial response to the spill set the operation up to fail. Things 
went wrong quickly and created an atmosphere that would easily allow internal tensions and 
organizational failures to fester. Responders were ill-prepared for a spill of this magnitude 
and no one knew exactly what to do. Equipment was either unavailable or not functioning. 
No one was sure who was responsible for starting the cleanup. It took days to ship the 
necessary supplies and workers to the area. Contingency plans were officially in place for the 
port of Valdez, as was required by law, but no one expected had anything like this to happen. 
 The first forty-eight hours following an oil spill are by far the most important. During 
that time period, the oil’s chemical composition begins to change.66 The Valdez leaked crude 
oil, which looks, smells, and behaves much differently from the gasoline that it was supposed 
to become. Apart from being thick (which is very different from slick, slimy gasoline), crude 
oil begins reacting with water from the moment it touches it.67 The water causes evaporation 
and decay, changing the oil’s composition into the thick that most people associate with the 
64 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 22. 
65 United States Coast Guard: Department of Transportation, Federal on Scene Coordinator’s Report: T/V 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 38. 
66 Ibid., 35. 
67Keeble, Out of the Channel, 199. 
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spill.68 This fact is important because it meant that people had to act quickly, before the oil 
became unmanageable. This need for haste, however, created additional problems.  
 Determining responsibility for the spill was one of the first difficulties. Gary Bader, 
the Alyeska’s Human Resources Manager, summarized those first two days by saying, “The 
window of opportunity was in the first forty-eight hours, and for the first forty-eight hours we 
at Alyeska were trying to figure out what the hell to do.”69 It was vital that companies began 
to move equipment and cleanup crews to the site, trained and ready to go within that time. 
But doing so requires a governing organization with the responsibility to control and fund the 
response and sufficient people and equipment nearby. The immediate response failed in both 
of these areas. 
 From the start, authority was not clearly delineated. During a small-scale spill, the 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company had authority for initiating and following through with 
cleanup. Following several legislative decisions in the early 1980s, to the Alaskan 
government quoted Exxon saying that “for most tanker spills, the response plan outlined in 
the Alyeska plan will suffice. However, in the event of a major spill by an Exxon owned and 
operated vessel, it is anticipated that the Exxon Company, U.S.A. Oil Spill Response 
Team…would be activated to manage the spill response.”70 This suggested that in the case of 
an undefined “major spill,” Exxon had responsibility for cleanup. Otherwise, Alyeska was in 
charge. The Department of Environmental Conservation in Alaska commented that “it is 
supposed to be Alyeska who is responsible for a cleanup and no one else, because that was 
68 Ibid. 
69 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 59. 
70 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, Oil Spill Contingency Plan, Valdez Terminal, January 1980 (Anchorage, 
AK: Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 1980). 
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the promise that oil companies made…that’s why they got…to build the pipeline.”71 The 
problem with this position, as the Exxon Valdez oil spill demonstrated, was that there was no 
time-efficient way to determine what constituted a “major spill.” Information was scrambled. 
Frank Iarossi, Exxon’s president, did not know if they had “a couple barrels…in the water 
or…more than that” when he started sending equipment and personnel to the spill site.72 
Because there was no definition of a major spill, there was no way of knowing whose 
responsibility it was to respond to a spill.  
 Efforts to determine authority created confusion. Several different agencies, all 
working independently, tried to control the spill, which quickly got out of control.73 Not only 
did Alyeska halfheartedly send equipment, but the Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation, the United States Coast Guard, and the Exxon Shipping Company all had 
reasons to be involved in the response and attempted to implement their own, separate 
contingency plans. Alyeska tried to respond first, coordinating with Coast Guard officials to 
distribute the equipment that they did not have. Meanwhile, Alaska government officials also 
tried to take control. Iarossi reportedly made his way to a town meeting, only to hear 
Governor Steve Cowper making decisions regarding cleanup.74 It appeared to residents, and 
to Iarossi, that the state government planned to spearhead the cleanup.75 But once Exxon 
“officially” took control of operations, state officials were frustrated by the disregard for their 
71 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 81. 
72Ibid., 31. 
73Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 59. 
74Ibid., 93; Dispersants were controversial method of oil spill response that involved dousing flowing oil with 
chemicals that would cause the oil to dissipate into particles so small as to be almost undetectable. For more 
information on dispersant use and study during the 1980s, see American Petroleum Institute, The role of 
Chemical Dispersants in Oil Spill Control, 1986 (see “References” for more complete citation). 
75 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 33; Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the 
Exxon Valdez Disaster, 93. 
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authority. As a result, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation Commissioner 
Dennis Kelso argued vehemently against the validity and legality of the transfer of 
responsibility.76  
 Meanwhile, officers from the Coast Guard were responsible for overseeing the 
response, but even that caused confusion. Coast Guard investigators believed their primary 
task was to find the cause of the spill and assess the damage.77   Coast Guard Admiral Clyde 
Robbins later stated that the Coast Guardsman who took on the role of “Federal On Scene 
Coordinator” was to be the coordinator, not the commander of the response, despite what the 
public expected.78 People looked to Robbins for answers, and expected him to take control. 
However, nothing gave him the authority to do so. Exxon had already claimed full 
responsibility and authority. This confusion dramatically affected the ability of agencies to 
move equipment to the spill area. Since no one had explicit authority, no direction was given. 
Agencies did not know what to bring to the site, and so they waited. Response efforts 
remained locked in a stalemate for the first few hours after the spill. 
 The second problem of the immediate response was unpreparedness.  Alyeska’s 
response planning assumed that because a major spill had never occurred, it was unnecessary 
to plan for one.79 It focused on preventing spills instead. In 1971, when it proposed building 
the pipeline, the Alaska state government agreed on the condition that the corporation would 
76 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 33. 
77 Nora Chidlow, “The Coast Guard’s Role in the Exxon Valdez Incident,” Exxon Valdez Grounding & Oil 
Spill, 1989, accessed December 4, 2013, http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/EV.pdf. 
78Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 107. For more on the role of 
the FOSC, see United States Government Accountability Office, Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills 
Occur Infrequently, but Risks to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain (for a more complete citation see 
“References”). 
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be prepared in the event of a spill.80 At first, Alyeska made contingency plans and held spill 
response exercises. But over time, its planners grew complacent. Response drills in the mid-
1980s resembled games and cleanup equipment went missing. By the time of the Exxon 
Valdez spill, much of the equipment was buried in warehouses.  The barge that the company 
had reserved for cleanup was not operational. Alyeska had broken its promise to be prepared. 
 Another problem was that the movement of available equipment was inefficient. 
According to its emergency response plan, Alyeska not only needed to have the equipment 
ready to respond, but were also expected to get it on site quickly.81 However, Alyeska took 
nearly 18 hours to get a single boom in place, and used it incorrectly once it arrived.82 Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation Commissioner Dennis Kelso later complained 
that the initial response was taking too long.83 State officials assumed that spill response 
would be quick and effective, preventing extensive damage. But when the initial response 
proved to be neither, people started asking questions to which agency officials had no 
answers. 
 The situation did not get any better once Exxon took over. Despite the company’s 
assurance that it took complete responsibility for cleanup efforts, it needed time to act. It took 
days to get equipment to Valdez, no matter how much money Exxon was willing to spend. It 
started from “ground zero,” with no system or plan in place to get people and equipment 
80Keeble, Out of the Channel, 20. 
81 Keeble, Out of the Channel, 20. 
82 Tamara Jones, "Oil Spill Cleanup Effort in Alaska Drawing Fire," Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), 
March 26, 1989; “Boom” is best described as “floating fence” whose purpose is to prevent oil from spreading; 
(Keeble 1991), 20. 
83 Richard Mauer, “Alaska Aide Assails Oil Industry for ‘Inadequate’ Response to Spill,” The New York Times 
(1923-Current File), March 26, 1989. 
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from Exxon headquarters in Texas.84 Alyeska employees, however, allegedly never received 
job assignments at the spill site. 85 Instead, federal officials and unemployed locals flocked to 
the area to work for Exxon. 
 This is where the untold story of the spill’s damage begins. Countless reports have 
detailed the problems with the response and the failure of the various agencies to react to a 
spill of such magnitude. The media, monographs, and government reports have covered he 
analysis of the response in terms of mechanics or organizational structure, from a top-down 
level, but an understanding of these failures sets the stage for the longer-lasting problems that 
emergency personnel would eventually leave behind. The effects of cleanup efforts on the 
local populations of the Prince William Sound have been ignored. The oiled birds and tainted 
beaches have been extremely visible in the years since the spill, but the broken homes, the 
lost ways of life, and the damages to Native American society have all been overlooked. 
  
  
    
  
84Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 35. 
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Chapter 2: Impacts on Infrastructure and Economy 
 The spill damaged the natural environment in ways that the contingency planners and 
oil companies had never imagined possible. Within hours, thick black oil covered the once 
popular beaches. Meanwhile, the press bombarded international viewers with footage of 
dying baby birds and drowning families of seals. The spill caused severe physical damage, 
with some areas still trying to recover nearly twenty-five years afterwards.86 But underneath 
the shocking images and scientific jargon, another story unfolded. Another Prince William 
Sound group experienced irreversible damage and change: the people, whose story has often 
been ignored.  
 This chapter is the first piece in telling the story that was never told. In their efforts to 
respond quickly to the spill, emergency responders, Exxon, and government agencies failed 
to consider the logistical challenges that responding to a spill in an isolated region, like the 
Prince William Sound, would present. This failure to consider the infrastructural capacity of 
the region resulted in a change to the economic and infrastructural environment of the local 
communities. The sudden boom of recovery personnel into the area, followed by an influx 
cash from temporary spill-related jobs, caused jarring shifts on three fronts.  
 First, the infrastructural stresses that responders and other visitors placed on the 
towns near the heart of the spill changed the urban environment and challenged their ability 
to continue functioning. Second, the sudden and temporary nature of cash flow into areas that 
did not have large cash economies causing the social understanding of money to change. This 
propagated negative and self-destructive behaviors. Finally, with the focus of recovery 
86 Laura Beans, “25 Years After Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Recovery Plan Still Needed,” EcoNews, last edited 15 
July, 2013, http://ecowatch.com/2013/07/15/25-years-after-oil-spill-recovery-needed/. 
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efforts solely on what was the physical environment, recovery efforts failed to foster an 
atmosphere in which local businesses and subsistence economies could return to pre-spill 
productivity levels in a reasonable amount of time. 
Infrastructure: Overcrowding & Sanitation  
 During the first stages of response and recovery, response planners are most 
immediately in need of personnel. For the response to the spill, people were one sufficient 
resource. The citizens of the small fishing towns situated on the sound were not the only ones 
concerned with trying to find a quick solution. Media reports and newscasts ensured that 
everyone who had access to public media knew that something had happened near Valdez. 
As a result, volunteers poured into the area to help. Volunteers came from everywhere, doing 
everything that they could to get in the middle of the mess. From the man who drove 5,000 
miles from his home in Pennsylvania to Valdez to the woman, Cecile, who flew from Hawaii 
in order to help, to the people who traveled from other areas in Alaska, people came to the 
Prince William Sound in droves.87 More than ten thousand arrive in total.88  
 Volunteers, however, were not the only people adding stresses to local utilities. 
Exxon alone hired a minimum of 11,000 people. Some were brought into the area to work, 
often called “scroungers” by their critics, while others were hired locally. 89 This number 
does not include the additional Coast Guardsmen, government officials, lawyers, and media 
87 Elspeth Leacock, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (New York: Facts on File, 2005), 35. 
88 Cedre, Exxon Valdez, 17 October, 2012, accessed 13 February, 2014, 
http://www.cedre.fr/en/spill/exxon_va/exxon_valdez.php. 
89 McDowell Group, An Assessment of the Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Alaska Tourism Industry 
(Seattle, WA: Preston, Thorgrimson, Shidler, Gates, and Ellis, 1990), 26. 
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representatives that also made to their way to the affected area.90 A new class of “disaster 
tourists” also descended on the area.91 They came to the area either to find work related to 
the spill or simply to see the destruction first hand. Disaster tourism was usually reserved for 
volcanic disasters, such as the eruption of Mount St. Helens. The oil spill, however, attracted 
visitors in a similar manner, though specific numbers of these “disaster tourists” are not 
available.92  
This influx of people was an unexpected shock. The town of Valdez reportedly had a 
regular population of around 3,000 people. After the spill, that number more than tripled. 93  
The population rose without the addition of grocery stores, restaurants, or any other key 
infrastructure. Chief Walter Maganack of Port Graham, Alaska referred to the phenomenon 
as a “human spill,” which was more difficult to measure and recover from than an observable 
oil spill. 94   
 The scale of the immigration was also evident in the increase in the amount of air 
traffic into the airport at Valdez. As isolated as Valdez was, a good week brought in a few 
planes a day. But during cleanup efforts, as many as 700 flights a day landed and departed. 
The airport was not prepared to handle this volume. Supplying and monitoring of the large 
number of aircraft was difficult. To compensate, airport staff created a temporary 
90Carrie Holba, “Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: FAQs, Links and Unique Resources at ARLIS,” Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services, June, 2010, accessed 4 December, 2013, 
http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol2/a/EVOS_FAQs.pdf; Elspeth Leacock, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill  
91 McDowell Group, An Assessment of the Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Alaska Tourism Industry, 
26. 
92 Ibid.; Tom Robbins, “Iceland’s erupting volcano,” The Guardian, Friday 2 April 2010. 
93 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
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200. 
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communications center to help with the overload and fuel problems. 95 Even then, four days, 
fuel shortages threatened further flights, spill-related or otherwise. 
 The sudden immigration stressed community housing and utilities. Towns able to 
provide housing for a limited population were faced with a population explosion. This wave 
of people almost immediately disrupted housing, sanitation, and the day-to-day functioning 
of the local government. Officials struggled with how to handle the spill and deal with the 
negative impact of the cleanup itself. Once all of the hotel rooms were filled, where would 
people sleep? If they slept in their cars, where would they park? Use the bathroom? Would 
water-supply systems be sufficient? And once it was all over, where would these people go? 
None of these questions had an easy answer. 
Residents took extreme measures to take advantage of the newdemand for basic needs 
like housing and transportation. Price gauging occurred regularly as residents rented out 
personal cars to strangers and ousted family members in order to lease out their beds.96 
Unofficial car rentals cost as much as $200 a day, while rooms cost at least $100 per night. 
The cost of renting an apartment rose by as much as $500.97 Some landlords may have 
evicted their tenants without cause in hopes of charging higher rent from cleanup workers 
who would pay.98 
 The quick move to price gauging demonstrated the area’s inability to adequately 
house visitors and responders in area that already suffered from a housing dilemma. Visitors 
95 Ceceile Kay Richter, “Appendix N,” in Spill: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, by Alaska Oil Spill 
Commission (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Oil Spill Commission, 1990).  
96 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 153. 
97 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 223. 
98 Joanna Endter-Wada et al., Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages, IV. Postspill Key Informant 
Summaries, 75.  
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traveled door-to-door to find housing. This should have been a signal to Exxon and local 
officials that something was not right. In order to protect the area and initiate cleanup for the 
environment, responders and visitors were propagating a pre-existing housing shortage in the 
Valdez. As of 1993, four years after the spill, stick-built homes lined the streets alongside 
trailers and higher-end housing.99 The housing shortage defined the physical make-up of the 
city prior to the spill. Consequently, the addition of several thousand people only made things 
worse. 
 The presence in the community of those were not “lucky” enough to find adequate 
shelter intensified the housing chaos.100 Due to the shortage of rooms and hotel space, 
homeless visitors were “sleeping under Visqueen tarps” and filling camping spaces that were 
usually reserved for NGO volunteers.101 Impromptu campsites popped up around Valdez. 
These campsites accommodated up to 516 camping units each, with each unit housing 
upwards of 500 or more tents, trailer, and vehicles. The man earlier who drove from his 
home in Pennsylvania was one of many who chose to live out of his truck, keeping his $35 
housing allowance from Exxon for himself.102 The presence of the homeless workers created 
an atmosphere that was shockingly “unnatural” for the community.103 
 Meanwhile, as the cities attempted to adapt to the increased population, the physical 
structure of many of the towns changed. Groups of people gathered together in close spaces, 
99 Ibid. 
100 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 153. 
101 Impact Assessment, Inc, Interim Report #3: Social and Psychological impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
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Steven Picou, “The Day the Water Died,” in American Disasters, ed. J. Steven Picou, Duane A. Gill, and 
Maurie J. Cohen (New York: 2001), 285. 
                                                 
  30 
polluting once family-friendly parks and campgrounds. 104 The clutter of tents shaped the 
landscape, damaging the environment, while landscapers deforested certain areas to 
accommodate the additional campers. This created a visible scar that lasted after the workers 
had gone. At the same time, beaches were roped off and fuel trucks blocked pedestrian 
pathways. The entire city of Valdez shut down and was trampled on to allow for its own 
“occupation.”105 
 The influx of people did not affect the area only aesthetically, but also created serious 
sanitation issues. Homeless visitors had neither bathrooms nor showers. Many volunteers and 
visitors to the area were without basic sewage or toilet systems (especially those living out of 
their cars). Health officials reported seeing “raw sewage flowing over the ground” in these 
areas where people had set up makeshift campsites.106 Additionally, many of the areas that 
were impacted by the spill and saw the heaviest cleanup worker concentrations were 
removed from bathroom facilities. Personnel simply relieved themselves on site.107   
Even where workers and visitors had access to indoor plumbing, the city soon 
experienced overloads on its sewage treatment plants. The plants had to handle double the 
amount of solid waste. Potable water demands often exceeded the daily maximum capcity by 
millions of gallons.108 Considering that Valdez was unable to manage waste created by its 
population in 2013, it is no stretch of the imagination to imply the system’s inability to 
104 Richard Mauer. “Greasy Army Overruns Alaska Town Near Spill: For many, home is a tent, a camper, or a 
car.” New York Times. 6 July 1989; Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009), pg. 
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process added amounts of waste in 1989.109  The unexpected pressure put on the systems 
during the response threatened dangerous overload and severe insufficiency of the system 
itself. 
This was not only a problem of inconvenience. Sanitation services are essential to 
prevent the spread of disease.110 The World Health Organization states that “crowding, 
inadequate water and sanitation, and poor access to health services,” which often occurs 
during the sudden movement of a population, increases the risk of communicable disease.111 
Alaska State epidemiologist Dr. John Middaugh commented that, during the spill, it was easy 
to “forget about some of the fundamental things.”112 The Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation, who normally took responsibility for monitoring public health, 
was preoccupied with the spill and were unable to address this issue. The community was 
thus more susceptible to a dangerous outbreak of disease. 
 Fortunately in this case, there was no major threat of disease.113 However, if cleanup 
efforts had continued for much, or if someone had been a carrier of a communicable disease, 
things could have turned out differently. This raises the question that if such a disaster, 
natural or technological, were to take place in a similarly isolated region, would responding 
109 “Valdez,” Copper River Knowledge System, last modified 2011, http://www.crks.org/wp/?page_id=180. 
110 Marianne J. Botting, Edoye O. Porbeni, Michel R. Joffress, et al., “Water and sanitation infrastructure for 
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Organization, 2006); Disease outbreaks as the result of exposure to oil are another issue that will not be 
addressed in this thesis.  
                                                 
  32 
agencies have a plan for an epidemic? And if not, is there a plan to prevent one? The fact that 
sewage was a problem at all raises the point that sanitation and the lack of availability of 
adequate hygienic facilities needed to be taken into consideration when responding to a spill. 
The failure to do so in 1989 created a potentially hazardous situation. 
Infrastructure: Emergency Responders 
The cleanup also strained essential services such as police, search and rescue, and 
EMS became more difficult. The additional number of people requiring assistance placed 
excessive stress on daily emergency management infrastructure. The small-scale emergencies 
and illnesses that occurred in spite of the disaster were not given priority in planning. The 
number of people in dangerous situations during cleanup and the increased crime rates 
challenged the scope of the local police and fire and rescue forces. At the same, an increase 
in patient admissions to local hospitals, doctors offices, and emergency rooms resulted in 
patient overload and understaffing. 
 The added number of people into the Prince William Sound area placed pressure on 
the local police stations. The police chief of Seward, for example, reported that the number of 
prisoners in the city jail was higher during the summer of 1989 than ever before.114 Officers 
worked upwards of 1,200 hours of overtime as crime rates increased by five-hundred 
percent.115 This demonstrated a lack of preparedness for the crowd control. Other situations 
where mass-crowds are expected usually warrant plans for crowd control and the necessary 
precautions are taken to ensure that an adequate number of police personnel are present at the 
114 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
141. 
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scene. The spill saw a crowd comparable to a large sporting event or concert. In this instance, 
because it was not typical, police forces were not prepared to handle the sudden increase in 
crime. Much like water systems, police officers were pushed to their limits.  
 This tension coincided with the additional challenges facing the local agencies that 
were responsible for protecting the public. Kodiak, for example, struggled to provide routine 
emergency fire and medical services.116 Firefighters needed to be present at the spill site to 
ensure worker safety. As a result, the Kodiak Fire Department cut its staff from six to two 
on-call volunteer firefighters. At the same time, local EMS experienced nearly a 50% 
increase in calls.117 The departments were stretched thin as they responded to the increased 
demand. And despite the number of qualified emergency responders coming into the area, 
they were there to fight the spill, not handle small-scale problems. The stresses placed on 
local operations were never part of response planning. 
 The Kodiak Island hospital experienced internal stresses where the lack of housing 
and the overcrowding of the suburban communities combined. Prior to the spill, hospital 
already suffered from a lack of nursing staff.118 The lack of availability of medical schools 
and the secluded nature of Kodiak meant that nurses were more willing to work in urban 
areas. This left the hospital indefinitely short-handed. So when tourists and cleanup workers 
started flooding the emergency room, nursing staff, like their firefighting counterparts, found 
themselves unable to compensate for the increased demand for services.  
116 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
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 The hospital considered bringing in additional staff from other areas, citing the need 
of the community to get cleanup workers in and out as quickly as possible and the necessity 
to keep the emergency room functioning for the sake of functioning.119 But the staff realized 
that this option would also create unintended consequences. Housing for additional nurses 
and doctors was not available. At the same time, the hospital also had to decide how to 
handle homeless patients. Many people came into be treated, only to have nowhere to go. 
This presented the hospital with both practical and moral problems. Was it right to send 
homeless patients back out into the cold with no running water, no bathrooms, and no beds? 
But there was also no way that they could keep them in the hospital. People were going to 
keep coming to Alaska, and they were going to keep getting hurt, and the hospital would 
have to do whatever necessary to keep things going.  
Economic Boom and Bust 
In addition to stresses to local housing and utilities, spill response created an 
interesting economic situation. At first, it appeared that the spill would add positively to the 
local economies. Practically, however, this was not the case. The response did not provide an 
avenue for economic growth. This resulted in societal stresses and made the local economies 
more susceptible to issues of inflation as the role of money in the community changed. 
The economic consequences of the response and recovery were not as immediately 
visible. At first, the potential of new customers encouraged entrepreneurs and small business 
owners. “This town is going to grow,” commented one cab driver at the onset of the 
incident.120 The influx of people meant that local restaurants and hotels profited from a sharp 
119 Ibid. 
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rise in customers.  As predicted, businesses experienced a boom and saw a quick and sudden 
increase in profits by providing essential services.121  
The spill also presented new job opportunities for the unemployed. The need for 
additional personnel to assist with cleanup, as advertised by Exxon, meant that any of 
Alaska’s 22,000 unemployed (and anyone else able to get to Alaska) had the chance to earn 
quick money.122 In a newspaper article published in Chicago not long after the spill, Exxon 
manager Otto Harrison mentioned that they would be hiring and bringing in 4,000 workers to 
begin cleanup efforts.123 Different contracting groups working for Exxon encouraged job-
seekers to assist with cleanup, offering starting rates of $16.69 an hour.124 This starting pay 
was almost $5.00 more an hour for people who worked in city government positions in small 
towns like Whittier. Subsequently, this pay was much more than that of wage laborers who 
worked in fish canneries or service industries. 
 The spill created an opportunity for job-seekers to bounce back from the pain of 
seasonal unemployment and to improve their social position. John Devens, Jr., son of Mayor 
John Devens, Sr., for example, found no work during the winter.125 As a fisherman, seasonal 
unemployment was the norm. But once Exxon began hiring, his knowledge of the Prince 
William Sound ensured that received a job with Exxon as a scrounger. He made more money 
that summer had ever seen. And it was not only the money that drew people to become 
121 Maurie J. Cohen, “Economic Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” in The Exxon Valdez Disaster: 
Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou, Duane A. Gill, and Maurie J. Cohen (Dubuque, IA: 
Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1999), 140. 
122 Neal Fried and Holly Stinson, Alaska Economic Trends, vol. 9, (Juneau, AK: Alaska Department of Labor & 
Workforce Development, 1989), 6. 
123 Casey Bukro. “Exxon to hire 4,000 for cleanup.” Chicago Tribune. 18 April 1989; ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1989), 8. 
124 Joanna Endter-Wada et al., Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages, IV. Postspill Key Informant 
Summaries, 321. 
125 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 112. 
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scroungers. Jobs with Exxon offered young fishermen the chance to prove themselves in the 
business arena. John Devens Jr., and others like him, used their expertise to rise the ranks 
among the contractors. At one point, Devens, Jr. was given command of a 120-man cleanup 
crew and the sense of power he immediately felt he described as “irresistible.”126 John 
Devens, Jr., along with thousands of other active young people, were part of an effort that 
gave them praise and profit with little to lose. 
 Sudden success stories like this were not uncommon. There was a 500% increase in 
job placement by the Valdez job service within weeks of the spill. 127 This added to 
perception that the spill would benefit the community. With the possibility of earning as 
much as $700,000 in a single summer with something as simple as renting out personal 
fishing vessels to cleanup workers, workers arrived on the scene in droves. It looked like 
unemployment would drop steadily as cleanup continued, and the standard of living for 
citizens would improve. 
 Though cleanup and recovery efforts brought the comfort and excitement of a new 
job for many, it also left behind new money. The problem with this was that local economies 
did not provide the means for healthy development. It is estimated that by the end of the 
cleanup, Exxon and coordinating contractors contributed $2.5 billion to the economies of the 
Prince William Sound area.128 Alaskan Economic Trends for July of 1989 suggested a net 
gain for Valdez in terms of profits, income, and total wages earned. The Seward Life Action 
Council (SLAC) even reported that “Money was plentiful during the summer. Some people 
126 Ibid. 112. 
127 Neal Fried and Holly Stinson, Alaska Economic Trends, vol. 9 (1989), 6. 
128 Maurie Cohen, “Economic Impact of an environmental accident: A time-series analysis of the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in southcentral Alaska,” Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association, 13:1 (1993): 41. 
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made more money than they have ever imagined. Some used it wisely; paid bills, got caught 
up, got ahead…”129 This was the opportunity that many people wanted; that chance to 
recover from chronic employment.  
 However, despite this prosperity, the temporary and selective nature of hiring created 
turbulent unemployment. This was one of the first areas to be negatively affected. Some of 
these negative consequences were the result of selective hiring. Not everyone who came to 
Alaska looking for oil work were given jobs by VECO, the leading contractor for Exxon.130 
Of the thousands of people that went to the Prince William Sound looking for work, not 
everyone was hired. Locals looking for high-paying jobs abounded, and they became the 
hiring priority.131 But even then, many of the locals who were hired deserted their own jobs, 
in the hotels in restaurants, and fisheries. These jobs were then left vacant because no one 
came to Alaska during the spill to work for minimum wage. Job-seekers wanted high paying 
jobs. And when those were not available, the jobless unable to return home remained. This 
raised unemployment levels as many continued to hope for spill-related work. 
 The expectation existed that workers in Alaska would experience a spill-induced gold 
rush, providing the opportunity to make money quickly and made enough to have a high 
standard of living long after cleanup was completed. When those expectations were not met, 
there was no backup plan, no other means of making money. For many potential scroungers, 
it was nothing. City officials commented on the types of people that remained, saying that the 
129 Mari Rodin et al., “Community Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” in The Exxon Valdez Disaster: 
Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou, Duane A. Gill, and Maurie J. Cohen (Dubuque, IA: 
Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1999), 197. 
130 Ibid., 198 
131 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
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unemployable persons who were already frustrated by travel and lack of money were sure to 
disrupt the balance of the local community structure.132 Tensions were high and jobs that 
paid above minimum wage were few. 
 The residents who left behind their low-paying jobs faced a similar problem. The 
amount of money they earned during cleanup was more than many had ever seen. The 
realization that it was possible to earn large sums of money quickly discouraged many from 
returning to their old jobs. They saw that they could work for $17.00 an hour, as opposed to 
$8.00. 133 As a result, the economic mindset of the community changed. This made the 
communities more susceptible to dangerous modes of self-destruction and increased crime. 
Residents and visitors alike not only dealt with the pressures of the spill itself, but now had 
the money to compensate. Similar stories manifested themselves throughout the communities 
surrounding the sound and will be looked at more in depth in the next chapter. 
Absence of Economic Recovery 
 The failure of response and recovery efforts to address community restoration also 
prevented economic recovery for both non-native and Alaskan Native communities. As 
mentioned, industry in the Prince William Sound revolved around fishing. Plans for 
economic recovery did not include programs to rehabilitate the fishing market. At the same 
time, in tribal communities, negligence both failed to provide the means for Alaskan Native 
communities to return to pre-spill economic levels and aggravated economic struggles 
through land grants meant to foster environmental rehabilitation. 
132 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
203. 
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As response shifted to recovery, the local fishing economy of the Prince William 
Sound region began to change. Many lower-class fishermen were forced out of their careers 
by the upgrades in equipment purchased by those who chose to work for Exxon.134 They 
invested in bigger and better boats to improve their businesses. At first, this appeared to be a 
positive technological advancement. However, for a lot of people, the modernization of the 
fishing industry created additional stresses because the advancements developed 
disproportionally.  
 For fishermen like Mike Webber using traditional fishing methods was no longer 
profitable. Many considered bankruptcy. Those who worked for Exxon during spill sold their 
boats, some worth $20,000, and upgraded to vessels worth almost ten times as much.135 This 
gave them an advantage over those using traditional methods. The problem was not that 
some fishermen were able to purchase more advanced technology while others were not. 
Rather, tensions arose because Exxon allegedly showed favoritism in hiring. This put some 
individuals at a deliberate disadvantage. Residents suggested that the hiring system was 
based on “who you were or who you knew.”136 On a smaller scale, the result was similar to 
that observed to come with globalization of developing economies.137 Obviously, the 
economy of the Prince William Sound was not as impoverished or disparate as that of a 
developing country. But the consequences of introducing sudden cash into the area appear to 
be nearly the same. There was an increased wage gap between those who took the money 
134 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 228. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
256. 
137 Angie Mohr, “The Effects of Economic Globalization on Developing Countries,” Small Business Chron., 
Demand Media, accessed 17 March, 2014, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/effects-economic-globalization-
developing-countries-3906.html. 
                                                 
  40 
from Exxon and those who did not (a characteristic fault of developing economies). It then 
followed that those who were unable to keep up with the technological advancements were 
forced into unemployment.  
 Simultaneously, in tribal communities, the buying and selling of land for restoration 
purposes challenged economic and social stability. Thhe Alaskan Native communities 
interpreted the land the spill in a different way than their non-native counterparts, and 
economic struggles in the community manifested themselves differently. In the case of tribal 
communities, response and recovery to the spill sped up the process of the loss of tribal 
ownership through the lens of economic exchange. One of the “ecological approach[es]” that 
the Trustee Council took in the recovery of the Prince William Sound was a program deemed 
“habitat protection.”138 The goal was that land damaged by the spill would be purchased 
from the Alaskan Native corporations and placed in state or federal control for rehabilitation. 
And while this may seem practical at first, in practice, the program removed large tracts of 
land from native control and put into question the ability of native communities to practice a 
subsistence lifestyle on historically tribal land.  
 From the beginning of the program, controversy and disagreement from both Alaskan 
Natives and non-Natives emerged. The Trustees Council was condemned fortheir “tempting” 
Native communities into selling lands that, based on the ANSCA, were rightfully theirs.139 
Many Native corporations created trust funds in order to appease critics of the program. 
138James A. Fall, Rita Miraglia, William Simeone, et al, Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
for Coastal Communities of Southcentral Alaska (Juneau, AK: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2001), 
195; The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council was created after the spill as the governing board responsible 
for overseeing the use of funds from settlements, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, “A State and Federal 
Partnership,” Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council: About Us, accessed on October 24, 2013, 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=aboutUs.home. 
139 Joe Hunt, Mission Without a Map: The Politics and Policies of Restoration Following the Exxon Valdez Oil 
Spill (Anchorage, AK: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 2010), 128. 
                                                 
  41 
However, even this failed to adequately protect all Alaskan Native interests as, over time, 
corporations dispersed the funds in manner that did not satisfy many of the corporation’s 
shareholders. This resulted in a “battle for…money” that saw the loss of, on average, fifty 
percent of native land and most of the restoration money to a single generation.140  
 Though the recovery plan was meant to be a win-win situation, encouraging 
environmental restoration while growing the economy, practically caused tensions within the 
Native communities and accelerated land loss of tribal governments.141 Taken in the context 
of the previously discussed interactions between tribal governments and 
businesses/governments interested in the development of oil, the purchase of land from 
native corporations was part of a broader history of Alaskan Native tribes losing land and 
autonomy. One report published for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, as part of an 
agreement with the US Department of the interior, even asserted that the “political and 
cultural survival of indigenous people are strongly linked to control of land.”142 The program 
designated various levels of “protective rights” which ranged from allowing public tourist 
access to limiting the rights to timber removal, on what had traditionally been native land.143 
Some tribes sold as much as 115,000 acres, shrinking their traditionally landholdings and 
impeding upon their own political authority, as the access that they will be granted to the 
140 Ibid., 127-129. 
141 Fall et al., Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of Southcentral 
Alaska, 302. 
142Ibid., 303. 
143 The Department of Natural Resources for Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Restoration Habitat Protection and Acquisition Atlas (Anchorage, AK: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 
1999), 5. 
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land is not based on the recognition of their traditional ownership, but on a shaky 
understanding of legislation based around Native corporations.144  
 People designated as “community facilitators,” hired to work with the Trustee 
Council, had similar concerns, arguing that individual tribal governments had no say in 
whether or not the sales would take place, since the for-profit Native Corporations and the 
Trustee Councils did all of the negotiating and exchange.145 This frustrated not only the 
facilitators, but anyone who did not hold a share in a Native Corporation, i.e. anyone born 
after 1971, because they received neither vote nor compensation for sold land, regardless of 
whether or not it was part of the village corporation that they called home.146 As is the case 
with any organization, opinions on the land sales were not homogenous. Alaskan Natives 
with ownership in the corporations saw this as the opportunity to move forward in capitalist 
economy, while non-owners only saw what they believed to be the violation of their 
traditional rights to their own lands. No matter the contention, though, the facts remain the 
same: land was sold, new money was exchanged, and heritage changed. 
What began with the reallocation of land from tribal governments to native 
corporations continued with the removal of land from native corporations to state and federal 
governments. Obviously, stigmatizing Alaskan Native tribes was not the intention of the 
habitat restoration program. It was, however, an unfortunate side effect of a plan that may not 
have been necessary for the complete recovery oiled lands. Many have criticized the Trustee 
144 Fall et al., Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of Southcentral 
Alaska, 303. 
145William E. Simeone and Rita A. Miraglia, An Ethnography of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek, Alaska, Special 
Pub. No. SP2000-001 (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence, 2000), 
145. 
146 Ibid.  
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Council with purchasing land that was “unaffected or marginally impacted” by the spill with 
administrative incentive.147 With the jump into purchasing lands for rehabilitation, it raises 
the question of why the organization/government was required to legally purchase the land 
from the corporations, as opposed to finding a way to work together in recovery efforts. This 
lack of cooperation between native and non-native agencies is consistent with the overall 
method of response and recovery taken by Exxon, VECO, and the United State government 
which would later challenge the social structures of many Alaskan Native communities. 
  
147 Richard Sylves, “How the Exxon Valdez Disaster Changed America’s Oil Spill Emergency Management,” 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1998): 27. 13-43 
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Chapter 3: Oil Spill Recovery as a Social Problem 
There were apparent economic and infrastructural issues that the mere presence of 
responders created. These effects, though rarely considered in the broad scheme of problems 
that the spill generated, are quantitative and measureable in the sense that we can look at 
economic trends, crime rates, etc. But in that span of time between the initial response and 
the movement towards litigation against the Exxon Mobil Corporation, the challenge arose of 
how to deal with the claims of social and cultural degradation allegedly caused by both the 
spill and the responders. For many, there was no concrete way to measure these claims, and 
they were ignored entirely. As a result, for both native and non-native communities, the 
nature of the spill, and its subsequent response and recovery, perpetuated negative social and 
cultural change that came out of a narrow understanding of what responders were there to do. 
Community Stresses 
Non-native communities faced social disruption that came out of the psychological 
shift caused by new money and the experience of what they had seen.  One sociologist who 
went to the Prince William Sound not long after the spill describes the situation as one in 
which the “fundamental view of how the world operates” was changed by their experiences 
with the government, Exxon, and the oil itself.148 The social makeup of the communities 
began to change from the instant that Exxon began handing out jobs to whoever they saw fit 
to take them. If people were not arguing about whether or not jobs were being distributed 
fairly, as some did not, the very existence of those jobs with Exxon created turbulence within 
the communities in a way that Exxon surely did not even consider.149 Scroungers, like John 
148 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 211. 
149 Ibid. 
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Devens, Jr. took advantage of what they considered an opportunity. They could make quick 
money. But for just as many people who took advantage of the jobs, there were those who 
were disgusted by the thought.150  
Some residents saw working for Exxon as selling out, working for the enemy who 
had caused the whole thing. Not only was it ineffective, but it was an issue of questionable 
morality.151 Residents that decided not to work with Exxon were resentful of their neighbors 
who did. Sometimes, people were frustrated with the intentions of the scroungers. Some 
people, apparently a small minority, joined with Exxon because they truly thought that that 
was the best way to move things forward. Meanwhile others were just looking for a quick 
way to make money.152  
This made the spill different than other disasters that had plagued these same areas. 
There was a culprit, the figurehead of Exxon, who could be blamed. The towns were used to 
fighting the oil companies together, one Cordova resident stated.153 They were used to 
standing together against the companies that wanted to build pipelines and ports. But this 
time, it was different. The “enemy” was working among them. The promise of money had 
started to override these traditional ties and turned the communities against themselves. The 
jealousy and bitterness that the unbalanced nature of hire and the wage gap brought into the 
communities consumed it like a bacteria. Some of the contention came from the fact that 
some of the agreements that were made with fishermen guaranteed that they would not 
150 Ibid., 225. 
151 Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
165. 
152 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 177. 
153Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
166. 
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publically condemn Exxon for anything.154 The company appeared to target the individuals 
who would not only get the work done, but would also create a positive image. 
At the same time, social tension plagued domestic life and challenged the heart of 
these communities: the family. Increased money, new jobs, and new people meant that 
family discourse constantly revolved around the spill and children grew up hearing that 
Exxon was nothing but bad.155 Parents could not explain what was happening. And that was 
for the children who had their family home with them. One young boy, whose father was an 
employee for Fish and Game in the Kodiak area, verbally cursed “Joe Hazelwood” for taking 
his father away. Anecdotes like this one capture the general problem that parents had to deal 
with. They left the home at odd hours and for extreme lengths of time. This meant that many 
children were suddenly left alone.156 Some children moved in with family members, some 
were forced into understaffed daycare centers, while others were left on their own. This not 
only saw increased crime among unsupervised young adults, but put emotional and physical 
stress on both the children and those charged with the responsibility of trying to take care of 
them. One Exxon official was quoted as saying “We don’t do kids” when a service worker in 
the area quested monetary childcare assistance for workers in the area.157  
 
 
154 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 177. 
155 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 271. 
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The Native Story 
Meanwhile, the overall story of the spill for Alaskan Native communities is one with 
added challenges, and many of those communities remember the spill differently than the rest 
of America. Their story emerged as one shaped by a history of otherness and the constant 
struggle to maintain a distinctly native identity while new governments attempted in every 
way possible to develop the world around them. Well into the 1990s, immigrants to Alaska 
still considered themselves pioneers of the western frontier, the last of a dying race dedicated 
to developing a thriving modern culture in America’s wilderness.158 Despite the fact that 
Native Alaskans often traced their histories back hundreds of thousands of years, they were 
still considered the “other” and were marginalized in every way possible by Alaskans from 
the continent, whose focus was often on oil drilling and the fulfillment of proverbial pipe 
dreams. Through the various bouts of legislation and interactions surrounding the eventual 
building of the pipeline, as described earlier, Native Alaska culture, based on very specific 
social structures, unique to each native community, and a subsistence way of life were being 
challenged by the infringing development.  
The spill, the response, and the attempted recovery of the area created an arena where 
Alaskan Natives, as both individuals and communities, were forced to confront the 
differences between their understanding of nature, which was defined by a spiritual 
connection, and that of the oil companies and the business-minded, who failed to 
acknowledge the authoritative presence of the Alaskan Native communities that had existed 
in the Prince William Sound for thousands of years.   
158Steven Haycox, Frigid Embrace: Politics, Economics, and Environment in Alaska (Corvallis, OR: Oregon 
State University Press, 2002), 149. 
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Leadership, Communication & Disorganization   
 Chief Walter Meganack, of Port Graham, in his testimony to the Citizens 
Commission Hearings, described the cleanup efforts as chaotic. He described Alaskan 
Natives who knew the area, and were connected with the water, battling with responders. His 
description reflected a hostile relationship between native community leaders and the 
invaders who he believed should have been “asking, not telling” that native people what to 
do. 159 Chief Meganack approached the spill from a position of authority in the native 
community. He is an Alutiiq, a group whose heritage can be traced back over seven thousand 
years.160 For the Alutiiq, the understanding of organizational leadership is unique. It is based 
on the combination of a traditional tribal structure with the creation of corporations under the 
Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act.161 Alongside elected mayors for various regions, 
since the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act, tribal councils have functioned for Native 
Alaskans as a federally recognized governing entity for tribal communities, for which most 
non-native communities have no equivalent.  
The relationship between the federal government and the tribal council is unique. 
Within these councils, decisions are made based on consensus and a mutual understanding of 
the consequences for all involved.162 In Tatitlek, for example, under the Indian 
159Thea Levkovitz, ed. The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens Commission 
Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 44. 
160 Christopher Wooley, “Alutiiq Culture Before and After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” American Indian 
Culture and Research Jounral 19:4 (1994): 125. 
161 Chugachmiut, Inc., Lennette Ronnegard, Nancy Anderson, and Helen Morris, Leadership: A Unit Focused 
on Leadership Roles Within the Community, 2009, accessed 4 February, 2014, 
http://www.alutiiqlanguage.org/files/lessons/Teacher%20Tools/Unit2.pdf. 
162Rodin et al., “Community Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” in The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings 
on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou, Duane A. Gill, and Maurie J. Cohen (Dubuque, IA: 
Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1999),  202. 
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Reorganization Act, there is no concept of a municipal government.163 An elected chief and 
council regularly make decisions collectively, with no real bureaucracy or government staff. 
Adversely, in the corporate setting, where division of labor is usually based on specialty, 
authority is based on a strict line of predetermined power delineation in which the CEOs or 
business heads have the final say. Alaskan Native communities were not familiar with this.164  
And responding agencies made no effort to help native communities understand this 
organizational structure. Consequently, Alaskan Natives responded negatively. An Alaskan 
Native of the Ouzinkie community in Kodiak expressed the intrusion by Exxon decision 
makers onto their lands as an imposition, saying that it was “intimidating” that their entire 
“way of life” was disregarded, disrespected, and the currently standing tribal governments 
were essentially ignored.165 Village leaders were unfamiliar with non-native government 
response to disasters. Emergency response personnel dispatched to the scene based on an 
early version of the Incident Command System, with Exxon and other emergency response 
agencies spearheading the decision making process. Exxon did not explain their emergency 
response and decision-making process to the native communities, creating confusion. 
Sheri Buretta, the daughter of a family living in Tatitlek at the time of the spill, 
commented that during the response, Exxon’s attitude was “offensive.”166 They did not try to 
understand the function of the tribal community. Chenga Bay resident Darrell Totemoff, a 
member of the Chenega Bay Village Council at the time of the spill, mentioned that “It was 
163U.S. Department of the Interior, Social Indicators Study of Alaskan Coastal Villages, Technical Report No. 
155 (New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files), 435. 
164Rodin et al., “Community Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” 202. 
165Impact Assessment, Inc. Interim Report#3: Social and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
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hard to get our point across a lot of time to people from Houston.”167 Exxon’s leading 
officials did not listen to what the Alaskan Native community wanted to say. Although an 
argument of silence is often discouraged in historic study, the absence in reports of an 
attempt by responders to cooperate with native agencies demonstrates that response planning 
did not consider the possibility of cultural incompatibility an issue. 
The result of this confusion, interactions between Alaskan Natives and non-natives 
were chaotic. Based on descriptions presented in the Impact Assessments that followed spill 
clean-up, it is evident that Exxon consistently overrode the tribal understanding of leadership 
roles and resource ownership. It is no question that within a capitalist business structure, the 
worker organization is based on an understanding of a bureaucracy of people in charge. The 
Incident Command System, which agencies used when responding to the spill, is a 
standardized organizational structure that provides responders with a top-down 
organizational leadership.168 Workers from Alaskan Native villages hired to assist with 
cleanup efforts were placed into organizational structures where the authority was based on 
title and they were encouraged to make their way up the hierarchy.  
While this organizational structure was familiar to the people being brought in from 
the continental U.S., it caused increased social tension and communal dysfunction in some 
small Alaskan Native villages. In Port Graham, for example, residents reported problems 
caused by the agitation of the generation gap between young villagers, placed in positions of 
authority, and older villagers, who were used to seniority present in tribal government.169 
167 Ibid., 250. 
168 For more about ICS, see “Introduction to Incident Command System, ICS-100.” ICS National Training 
Curriculum, Independent Study Program, National Wildfire Coordinating Group, October 2013. 
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Jennifer Dilley, a Seldovia resident, commented at the Citizens Commission Hearings on the 
spill that Exxon “refused” to respect the local people through their hiring practices. 170 They 
overrode the traditional social hierarchy, creating friction between tribal leaders and the 
leaders of the responding agencies.  
The modification of social roles in native society represented more than ideological 
differences. Exxon blatantly neglected tribal organization and positions of authority.171 It 
demonstrated that respecting the cultures of native communities was not important during the 
response. This heightened the tension of interaction between the local governments and 
Exxon and negatively impacted the ability of some areas to begin successful cleanup 
operations in a timely manner and the native villages were already at a disadvantage. Native 
villages such as Tatitlek, or the even smaller Akhiok, did not have the political or tangible 
infrastructural resources available to begin to handle an emergency of this magnitude.172  
Response was often delayed or non-existent for these communities who did not 
participate in non-native politics.173 Alaskan Native villages in the region had never been 
involved in this sort of interagency cooperation before, and especially not on such a large 
scale. It was the obligation of the responsible party, i.e. Exxon, to be more active in assisting 
with coordination between tribal communities and the response agencies.174 Instead, Alaskan 
170Thea Levkovitz, ed. The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens Commission 
Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 29. 
171Impact Assessment, Inc. Final Report: Economic, Social, and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, 84. 
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“Alaska Oil Spill Commission: Oiled Communities Response Investigation Report,” in Spill: The Wreck of the 
Exxon Valdez, by Alaska Oil Spill Commission (Anchorage, AK: State of Alaska, 1990), 20. 
173 Sharon McClintock, “Alaska Oil Spill Commission: Oiled Communities Response Investigation Report,” 11-
12. 
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Native communities were left on their own without the physical resources or training 
experience necessary to coordinate cleanup, and it was not their responsibility to teach 
themselves. This exhibited a failure on Exxon’s part to understand the comprehensive nature 
of response and recovery. Eventually, the “Oiled Mayors” group was created as a forum for 
complaints and the transfer of information among small local native and non-native 
governments. Its creation, however, did not eliminate all miscommunication, but instead 
gave residents the opportunity to voice their complaints.175 
The Trouble with Subsistence  
 In addition to confronting what the oil did to the land itself, Alaskan Natives also 
suffered from the lack of attention given to the rehabilitation of subsistence practices. The 
word “subsistence” has generally come to describe the process of “harvest[ing], process[ing], 
distribut[ing], and consum[ing]” natural resources as part of a traditional economy and 
foodway. During the spill, and the response to it, the way that responding agencies handled 
the spill put at risk the subsistence way of life that characterized that native identity of many 
Alaskan Natives. Oil in the water threatened to permanently damage not only the 
environment, but use of the environment as well. Response efforts to the spill gave more 
weight to issues of protecting the environment for its own than in providing a method of 
rehabilitation of Native foodways. 
Exxon’s problematic approach to the restoration of subsistence practices is evidenced 
by the company’s definition of a cultural resource. In the section of their Cultural Resource 
Program. which outlined the “sources of Potential Impacts to Cultural Resources,” they 
175 Sharon McClintock, “Alaska Oil Spill Commission: Oiled Communities Response Investigation Report,” 20. 
                                                 
  53 
specifically stated that “cultural resources were not directly threatened as long as the oil 
stayed on the water…[they] were at risk only when the oil floated to shore.”176 This 
demonstrated the response focus on physical effects of the spill in terms of what could be 
observed and measured. Within the program, most of the ethnography provided for affected 
communities focused on the archeological and architectural history of the area, not the 
cultural or social history. 
The failure to include the restoration of subsistence practicing during recovery 
showed Alaskan Natives that Exxon did not recognize the importance of cultural damages 
from the spill. Traditional food-sources and cultural pathways were threatened by the very 
presence of the oil on the water and Exxon, along with the other responding agencies, made 
no effort to understand how subsistence worked and what it meant for the communities who 
shaped their lives around it. The consequence of the ignorance was that Alaskan Natives 
were forced to deal with two negative consequences, in addition to the spill itself, of the loss 
of subsistence. The negligence regarding subsistence protection challenged both the ability 
for some Alaskan Native communities to acquire daily nutrition and the cultural continuity of 
traditional subsistence practices.  
The day-to-day nature of subsistence harvests as it related to the community food 
source was evident almost immediately. Alaskan Natives knew that oil could contaminate all 
parts of the environment, from the salmon in the water to the deer drinking the water, even if 
there was nothing visibly wrong.177 So they started asking questions in hopes of finding out if 
their traditional food-sources were safe and how they would be able to tell. When Alaskan 
176 Mobley et al. The 1989 Exxon Valdez Cultural Resource Program, 101. 
177 Fall et al., Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of Southcentral 
Alaska, 170. 
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Natives of Tatitlek, one of the villages most closely located to the source of the spill, asked 
these questions, they were told that the primary way to know what was good to eat and what 
was not was to smell, taste, and see. The answer from the state government was that “if the 
fish smell or taste of petroleum, they should not be eaten.”178 The state of Alaska gave them 
no assurance of what could happen if they ate contaminated wildlife, and even used the 
phrase “it is almost certainly safe to eat” in regards to wildlife that passed the smell and taste 
test. 
Alaskan Natives who relied on subsistence foods were not familiar with purchasing 
food from grocery stores, and in some cases, transitioning directly to purchasing processed 
foodstuffs was not a viable option. The cash economy that existed in many Alaskan Native 
villages was not substantial.179 With the spill, cash acquired from these jobs dwindled while 
flying in food was extremely expensive. As a result, some emergency food programs were 
instituted through both Exxon and the Russian Orthodox Church, but even then, 
miscommunication concerning the safety of this food made transitioning difficult. There 
were several instances in Tatitlek and Chenga Bay where Exxon shipped and distributed food 
that was later classified as “unfit for human consumption” because the seafood was actually 
intended to be used as otter food in Valdez. 180  
When Alaskan Natives voiced these concerns, response from Exxon was minimal. No 
one in Chenega Bay actually reported getting sick from the seafood, but in Tatitlek, some 
178 Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Public Health, Section of Epidemiology, “Oil 
Spill Public Health Advice,” State of Alaska Epidemiology Bulletin No.6 (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Department 
of Health and Social Services, 1989). 
179 Impact Assessment, Inc., Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Cleanup, and Litigation: A Collection of Social-Impacts 
Information an Analysis, 2.3. 
180 Fall et al., Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of Southcentral 
Alaska, 180, 183. 
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residents experienced symptoms of food poisoning. An attempt was eventually made to 
contact Exxon about the misunderstanding, but the response was that they would collect the 
remaining food, but did not understand why the villagers were disappointed with the “top 
quality” of food sent to them.181 Additionally, there was added benefit from Exxon’s 
perspective that they were being sent food at all, since some Alaskan Natives were not 
qualified by Exxon standards to receive assistance, such as the Alaskan Natives in Cordova. 
Some families even reported sending groceries to their friends in Cordova because even 
though Exxon insisted that traditional foodways were not affected in Cordova, there was still 
apparently a need. 
But even more long-term, the disruption of subsistence practices by the spill, and the 
failure to address subsistence recovery, created what same have described as a culturally 
traumatic shift in Alaskan Native communal history.182 Alaskan Natives worried that they 
could never go back to subsistence harvesting and that a major piece of their traditional way 
of life was never going to recover from the spill. Chief Walter Magenack’s testimony to the 
Citizens Commission Hearings on the spill in 1989 paint an elegant picture of what the 
relationship between Alaskan Natives and the ocean looked like before the spill. “Of all the 
things we have lost since non-Natives came to our land,” he said, “We have never lost our 
connection with the water. The water is our source of life. So long as the water is alive, the 
Natives are alive.”183 The interaction of the harvester, hunter, etc. with nature maintains a 
181 Ibid. 
182 Impact Assessment, Inc., Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Cleanup, and Litigation: A Collection of Social-Impacts 
Information an Analysis. 
183Thea Levkovitz, ed. The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens Commission 
Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 44. 
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relationship with nature itself and strengthens ties within the community.184 A threat to the 
subsistence way of life is perceived as a threat to Alaskan Native tradition and existence. 
The cultural importance of subsistence made its disruption an important piece of the 
oil spill puzzle for Alaskan Natives. The cultural loss that tribal elders felt from their inability 
to continue with subsistence harvests during the spill troubled them. Alaskan Natives 
interviewed three years after the spill still said that subsistence harvesting was an important 
part of their childhood memories and they wanted to continue that transmission of physical 
culture from generation to generation.185 Fortunately, by the late 1990s, the number of 
Alaskan Native households actively participating in subsistence practices had returned to pre-
spill levels.186 This meant that despite the hiatus during spill years, the tradition of 
subsistence was still an active part of daily live for many Alaskan Natives by the turn of the 
century.  
That does not mean, however, that subsistence culture has entirely recovered. Though 
the number of households participating in subsistence grew, the number of young adult 
participants declined.187 The spill sparked a change in the understanding of where food or 
money came from, and young adults either did not have the time or were not interested to 
learn the basics of subsistence harvesting. Whether through a natural progression or as the 
result of the spill, Alaskan Natives have noticed a change in priorities for the post-spill 
generation. Packaged food is more common and families have become more interested in 
184David Case and David Voluck, Alaska Natives and American Laws: Third Edition (Fairbanks, AK: 
University of Alaska Press, 2012), 267. 
185J. Steven Picou, “The Day the Water Died: Cultural Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” 179. 
186 James Fall and Charles Utermohle, Subsistence Harvests and Uses in Eight Communities Ten Years After the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Technical Paper No. 252 (Juneau, AK: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division 
of Subsistence, 1999). 
187Fall et al., Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of Southcentral 
Alaska, 260. 
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work, athletics, and television.188 John Allen, a resident of Port Graham, commented that 
young people were not actively engaging in fishing and hunting because they were not 
interested.189 “The oil industry has the right to develop…but I don’t think they have the right 
to destroy people’s lives and livelihood.” And that is exactly what he believes Exxon did 
during the oil spill. 
  
188 Ibid., 263. 
189 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 249. 
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Afterward: Hope for Future Spills 
There is, though, a small light at the end of the tunnel in terms of social progression 
that made its way as the result of the way spill response as handled: one legislatively and one 
culturally. After the spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 which addressed 
many of the issues surrounding the spill, mostly in regards to oil tanker regulations, modes of 
response, and who was responsible when a spill happened (the details of which will not be 
analyzed in this work). But in addition to logistical details, OPA90 acknowledged the tribal 
government as an agency separate from that of the state or federal governments. Throughout 
the act, the designation is made for “Indian tribe trustees” and “the authorized representative 
of any…Indian tribe” to represent native interests during a spill.190 The provision grants these 
“tribal trustees” the responsibility of deciding on a plan of action for rehabilitation of natural 
resources within their jurisdiction.  
Though hidden among stipulations for state trustees and foreign trustees, the 
recognition of tribal trustees signaled movement towards the greater inclusion of native 
governments in oil spill response coordination.  Since there has not been a spill of a 
comparable scale in Alaska since the Exxon Valdez, it is difficult to say whether or not 
relations between Alaskan Natives and oil spill responders/oil companies would be improved 
as a result of this legislation. In fact, in terms of tribal recognition, Alaska has been classified 
as an entirely different animal due to the complex relationship between tribal governments, 
Native Corporations, and grassroots Alaskan Native non-profit organizations, which operate 
separately from the designated corporations.191  
190 33 U.S.C. 2701. U.S. House, Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 
191 Julie Kitka, Alaska Federation of Natives to Secretary Ken Salazar, April 25, 2012. 
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Despite problems, it is important to acknowledge that there were some positive 
cultural changes immediately following the spill. Amidst the cultural shift that Alaskan 
Natives were experiencing with the continuing development of that areas near the pipeline, 
the spill sparked a rejuvenated effort for cultural preservation. Understandably, the threat to 
subsistence described earlier led to collective worry of the ability of native tribes to protect 
the remnants of their traditional way of life. One interviewee, in reference to subsistence 
disturbance, went so far as to say that subsistence was all that their tribe had left in terms of a 
“cultural tradition.”192  
Those fears resulted in a movement which aimed to protect and strengthen native 
culture, especially for the Alutiiq. Despite the loss of land control, the Alutiiq as a cultural 
entity have thus far benefited from the use of settlement money for funding what one 
researcher calls “revitalization programs.”193 The concept was that through the renewal and 
revitalization of subsistence resources, the re-forming of native bonds would result. One legal 
consultant for Exxon at the start of the spill litigation, Christopher Wooley, suggested that 
through the use of oil spill funds, Alutiiq communities were able to build a cultural center 
and museum, as well as benefit from the increased archeological study that came as a result 
of the Cultural Resource Program.194 Based on his explanation of the situation, resources 
from spill recovery counteracted the loss of traditional culture that many communities were 
facing as the result of adaptation to a world that was changing around them. 
192 Impact Assessment, Inc. Final Report: Economic, Social, and Psychological Impact Assessment of the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, 58. 
193 Fall et al., Long-Term Consequences of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill for Coastal Communities of Southcentral 
Alaska, 304. 
194 Christopher Wooley, “Alutiiq Culture Before and After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” 147. 
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To a certain extent, this is true. It is human nature that when faced with diversity, 
marginalized groups come together and solidify their identity, and in one sense, that is what 
happened. Wooley noted, rather condescendingly, that during and after cleanup, Alutiiq 
natives spoke of themselves with what he described as a “renewed sense of self,” working 
together against the spill with a stronger understanding of community and a dedication to 
unity.195 From Wooley’s perspective, much of the negativity surrounding cultural impacts of 
the spill was the result of the press and ulterior motives surrounding the process of litigation 
and that, in reality, the spill actually created an “awareness of…self-worth” and a greater 
“appreciation” of traditional subsistence foods.196 
This picture that Wooley painted less than a decade after the spill fails to mention the 
other side of the story. Although it is true that in Kodiak, there Kodiak Aera Native 
Association’s Culture and Heritage program received a grant of $1.5 million from the Oil 
Spill Trustee Council for the creation of a repository and research facility focused on Alutiiq 
history and archeology, other groups that were a part of the spill, response, and recovery 
were not so lucky.197 Some communities have reportedly had issue getting any sort of 
funding for their projects because the courts and government attorneys responsible for the 
monetary settlements after the spill set very specific criteria for receiving grants, denying 
many projects they are not “sufficiently related” to the environment as a means of culture.198  
195 Christopher Wooley, “Alutiiq Culture Before and After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” 148. 
196 Ibid., 147. 
197 “Welcome to the Alutiiq Museum,” Alutiiq Museum: Archeological Repository, accessed 31 January, 2014. 
http://alutiiqmuseum.org/component/content/article/50-front-page/front-page-article/619-welcome-to-the-
alutiiq-museum.html. 
198 William E. Simeone and Rita A. Miraglia, An Ethnography of Chenega Bay and Tatitlek, Alaska, 143. 
                                                 
  61 
In fact, despite Wooley’s assertion that some cultural revitalization was directly 
related to spill recovery, even if cultural change was not, in the 2009 Status Report by the 
Trustee Council, it was explicitly stated that, “The Trustee Council funds restoration projects 
that directly benefit injured resources by improving habitat[s] of injured species or 
preventing additional damage to these critical habitats.”199 So while construction of the 
museum was funded by the Trustee Council, with the primary purpose of displaying, 
organizing, and cataloging archeological finds of the Exxon Cultural Resource Program, 
there have been few additional programs funded specifically for cultural preservation.200  
This does not negate the importance of funding given various subsistence 
enhancement projects and the creation of facilities to circumvent pollution. On the contrary, 
the council funded multi-year restoration projects up and down the Alaska coast, most of 
which appeared to be successful in increasing salmon and clam harvests, for example.201 The 
restoration of natural habitats set the stage for some return to subsistence, as well as the 
development of archeological programs for Alutiiq communities, and that was unarguably a 
positive side-effect of spill response. However, it is worth noting that even with the good 
things that came out of an increased awareness of a need for cultural revitalization, there 
existed during the response and recovery to the spill a constant disinterest in purely native 
interests. As a case study on the litigation describes it, the “Native story” was overlooked 
199 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 2009 Status Report (Anchorage, AK: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Trustee Council, Northern Printing, 2009), 23. 
200 The Trustee Council also did provide funds for an additional archeological repository in Seward. 
201Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 2009 Status Report, 24. 
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almost entirely and when native interests were acknowledged, they were acknowledged 
through the lens of the environment.202 
  
202 William Rodgers, Jr. et al., “The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Settlements and Roads 
Not Taken,” Alaska Law Review 22:2 (2005): 143.  
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Conclusion 
 In the end, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was much more than responders thought to plan 
for and more than oil companies had ever thought possible. The spill itself targeted a fragile 
natural environment and challenged the way that Americans viewed not only disaster 
response, but environmentalism as a whole. It demonstrated that technological disasters are 
possible in America. They will happen. They will be destructive. And we cannot let our 
guard down, falling into complacency in terms of preparedness. But the spill also showed 
that the agencies responding to the spill, Exxon, VECO, and the Coast Guard, during that 
time period, were operating under a lack of understanding for cultural sensitivities and the 
broader meaning of what disaster recovery looks like. 
 The communities surrounding the Prince William Sound that were affected by the 
spill, as demonstrated in chapter one, were a strange balance of fragile and resilient. The area 
was not new to the experience of having their world turned upside down. Both native and 
non-native communities had suffered from a traumatic 1964 earthquake that drowned the city 
of the Valdez, but they rebuilt and recovered. Not ten years after the earthquake, the way of 
life that Alaskan Natives and settler Alaskans were accustomed to was challenged again by 
the building of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, a milestone in the story of oil in Alaska. The 
building of the pipeline into Valdez aggravated the local economies, altered the rate of 
unemployment through the boom and bust method of hiring during construction, and 
overwhelmed the small communities that the pipeline ran through with workers who came 
with money on their minds. But the people were resilient, moving forward once the pipeline 
was built and focusing on fishing and subsistence for a living, as they always had. Though 
they endured hardships for several decades, the people of the Prince William Sound lived by 
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adapting to the changes around them, and continuing to thrive when the hand of nature sunk 
their villages, or oil companies began moving into the area, adding to the local population 
and leaving a visible scar of the pipeline. 
 In 1989, however, the communities of the Prince William Sound were faced with a 
disaster that they would not so easily recover from, partially as a means of the response and 
recovery efforts. The influx of workers from the continental US, from other parts of Alaska, 
and from government agencies stressed local infrastructure and changed the physical nature 
of the communities, while with the pouring of cash into the local economies changed 
peoples’ perception of how the economy was supposed to work. Response and recovery 
efforts continued the pattern of the Prince William Sound as a boom and bust economy in 
which people and money moved in and out of the area so quickly and suddenly, that 
continual growth was not sustainable. Hotels were filled and canneries deserted as visitors 
kept coming, bringing money and development. But once cleanup efforts were over, they 
left, creating a proverbial ghost town where returning to the old way of life was hardly an 
option. People, once they experienced what it was like to work for large amounts of money, 
were unwilling to go back to the way things had been, working long hours for minimum 
wage dusty factories. This inhibited the possibility for economic recovery from the spill. Not 
only had the communities lost fishing harvests for the year, but now there were not enough 
workers who were willing to start over again. 
 Meanwhile, social tensions were on the rise. The addition of unhoused, out of work 
people into Valdez saw a rise in crime and interfamily stress. Citizens were being pulled in 
several different directions, struggling to grasp the emotional conflict of a technological 
disaster at the same time that they were trying to clean it up. Simultaneously, the Alaskan 
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Native communities struggled with another level of stress that came as the result the mutual 
incompatibility of the methods and meanings of recovery as defined by the cleanup workers 
and spill responders and those defined by the Alaskan Native communities. The narrow 
understanding of recovery as a physical entity becomes most apparent for the Alaskan Native 
story because many of the negative consequences that they experienced were not 
immediately visible or measurable. The social construction of authority in the Alaskan 
Native communities was different than that of the Exxon workers, resulting in added conflict 
within tribes and villages that made cleaning up after the spill that much more difficult. At 
the same, cultural institutions that had been affected by the spill, such as the practice of 
subsistence, were being ignored for their cultural value by the response. This inhibited 
cultural and social recovery in Alaskan Native communities specifically, and triggered a 
cultural change away from tradition that has yet to fully return to the level of pre-spill 
practice. 
 Responders and response planners failed to consider the negative consequences of 
their actions. The goal was to get people into the area to look like they were doing something 
productive despite setbacks.203 The organizational struggles described in chapter one resulted 
in an ineffective and conceptually shallow response. Visible oil was the priority for both 
Exxon and the Coast Guard. There were several instance in which Exxon was willing to 
hiring additional workers, or send them certain places, with the sole purpose of increasing 
their numbers.204 The number of people were measurable. If it looked like they were doing 
something to effectively clean up the mess that they had created, than Exxon’s reputation 
203 Associated Press, “Exxon rebuts cleanup complaints,” Chicago Tribune (1963-Current file), May 9, 1989, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-`990), 16; Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal 
Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 113. 
204 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 138. 
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could be salvaged along the visible oil. But it was never a part of the equation whether or not 
the area would be able to handle that large number of people. Planners also never seemed to 
consider what social or economic effects that not only the oil, but the year-long process of 
cleanup, would have on the local communities.  
 The response ignored the human element of the disaster, for both responder and 
victim. People affected by the spill approached the spill in a very different way than the 
responders did. For many residents, it was an extremely emotional experience.205 The people 
of the Prince William Sound adapted to previous disasters that plagued the area, but the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill was different. The building of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline was 
problematic, but not thoroughly destructive. The earthquake of 1964 was an act of nature, 
destructive but accepted as part of the natural cycle of life.206 But the nature of the cause of 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill ensured that it would be both destructive and unacceptable. The 
man-made nature of the spill gave the disaster an added key player: someone to blame. And 
this targeted painful emotions that would have made even a well-organized cleanup process 
difficult. Disaster response will never lose its human element. Residents of the sound were 
struggling with anger, fear, and worry. Their lives were torn apart by the minute, and some of 
them did not even know that the spill had happened until they saw it on the news.207 
 At the same time, responders and the responding organizations operated under a 
separate viewpoint, with emotions and motivations that differed from those affected by the 
spill. Exxon had its own understanding of what recovery meant and its workers came to the 
205 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 217. 
206 Yereth Rosen, “‘Black Swans’ of Science: Alaska’s big earthquake and Exxon Valdez oil spill,” Alaska 
Dispatch, 20 January 2014. 
207 Bushell and Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 40. 
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spill with the belief that things of this nature did not happen.208 Responders did not have the 
time or equipment to readjust their mindset. It appears also that, inexcusably, responders and 
spill workers, as I already mentioned, came to the response with a certain belief in racial 
differences and their own understanding, or lack thereof, of the way that rural or Alaskan 
Native tribal communities functioned and perceived the world. 
 This meant that during the response, there was a general lack of cultural 
understanding that hampered recovery and damaged response efforts in the ways that I have 
demonstrated above, economic/infrastructural and in the social sphere. Cultural differences 
play a huge role in anything and everything that we do as humans. And while this may sound 
like common sense, and it is, it is not something that response workers, government officials, 
or us on a day to day basis take a moment to remember. The recovery phase of the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill was as difficult as it was in part because of this lack of understanding. Had 
there been more of an effort to look at the spill from the Alaskan Native or the rural non-
native fishermen perspective, things would not have run smoothly (lack of preparedness 
ensured that), but it may have mitigated some of the detrimental effects described in this 
thesis. 
 The response and recovery to the spill was an exercise in personnel and volunteer 
management. I have demonstrated that personnel and volunteer management failed to address 
logistical considerations for both the workers coming in and the communities that they were 
invading and that the social interactions between spill workers and Alaskan Native 
communities were less than ideal. It is important to acknowledge where we have failed in 
208 Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, 35. 
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order to see where we are going, and see where we have improved and where we can 
continue to grow.  
For instance, we do have the Deepwater Horizon spill of 2010, which was 
considerably larger than the 1989 spill and affected twenty-five American Indian tribes in the 
Gulf Coast area, to look to for comparison.209 To fully compare the response and recovery 
efforts between these two spills would take volumes to cover. However, we can look to one 
instance in this spill to see that things have begun to change. Shortly after the containment of 
the spill, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator for the spill, USCG Rear Adm. Paul Zukunft, 
held what was called a “historic government-to-government” meeting, the purpose of which 
was to initiate communication between the federal and tribal governments who were affected 
by the spill. At the meeting, several of the tribal leaders presented Rear Adm. Zukunft with 
awards and coins from their tribes.  
In fact, amendments made in the past two decades to the 1966 National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) require that a “government-to-government” relationship with tribal 
leadership is recognized and executed in the decision-making process.210 This change, 
though a day late and a dollar short for those tribes affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
response, recognizes the fact that there was an issue with the response to the spill in regards 
to native inclusion and attempts to remedy the problem in a way that seemed to be at least a 
step forward for natives who were affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill. And though the 
209 Margo Schwadron, “Officials, Native American Leaders Discuss Deepwater Horizon Response Operations,” 
Restore the Gulf, last edited 23 September, 2010, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/09/23/officials-
native-american-leaders-discuss-deepwater-horizon-response-operations. 
210 Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, “Questions & Answers: Consideration and Treatment of Historic 
Properties During the Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” June 2010, 
http://www.achp.gov/docs/OilQandA.pdf; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Federal Historic 
Preservation Case Law, 1966-1996 (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 2002), 7. 
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event was not widely publicized (as American Indian communities were not as dramatically 
affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill as the Alaskan Natives during the Exxon Valdez), 
the change acknowledges that in disaster response, technological or otherwise, responding 
agencies must consider cultural differences and be prepared for open communication among 
all people, groups, communities, and agencies affected by the disaster or assisting in 
response.  
These principles are not isolated to oil spills affecting native or rural communities. 
The things observed before, during, and after the Exxon Valdez spill apply to all disasters in 
all communities as part of the larger American story. Disasters have always been and always 
will be part of our history. Hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and nuclear failures are all 
threats, to name a few. As we continue to develop technologically, it seems reasonable that 
oil spills and malfunctioning nuclear plants, or chemical accidents, will continue. The 
occurrence of technological disasters is increasing.211 In fact, 2012 saw a 2.3% increase in 
natural disasters alone, not including technological disasters and oil spill of various sizes.212 
This means that as a nation, as well as on an individual level, everyone needs to be thinking 
about these disasters and the response to them because they will happen again. 
And just as these disasters grow in frequency, our culture continues to become more 
diversified along everything from cultural to economic to political lines and these differences 
will always play a huge role in how victims of any type of a disaster respond to it. This is one 
thing that I feel certain will never change. There will always be some sort of 
211 Damon P. Coppola, Introduction to International Disaster Management (Burlington, MA: Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2011), 95. 
212 Debarati Guha-Sapir, Philippe Hoyois, and Regina Below, Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2012: The 
numbers and trends (Brussels: CRED, 2013), 21. 
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miscommunication and social tension that interferes with any form of effective response. But 
that does not mean that these differences need to be ignored, or the problems that they cause 
accepted as part of the problem. Is not sufficient to conclude that Exxon’s perception of 
recovery from the spill and the Alaskan Native/rural Alaskan perceptions of the same event 
were different, mutually incompatible, and therefore, economic and social conditions to be 
accepted as inevitable. On the contrary, the way that the cultural differences played 
themselves out during the Exxon Valdez oil spill provides future emergency responders the 
opportunity to learn and improve. We can look back at this event and realize that in order to 
successfully recover from something as devastating as an oil spill, every voice needs to be 
heard and listened to. That is the only way that people and societies will ever recover.  
There has been much growth and improvement in communication during disaster 
response since the spill, but there is still a ways to go. Government agencies like the Coast 
Guard are improving diversity within their ranks, but fully understanding where the victims 
of disasters of various cultures and social conditions are coming from will take case-specific 
training and interpersonal communication standards. Ironically, although I mentioned that the 
Coast Guard had begun to consult with and inform the local American Indian communities 
that were affected by Deepwater Horizon, that, from a local resident perception, was as far as 
it went. Other residents of the Gulf felt that their voices were not heard, their opinions not 
considered, and their cultural livelihoods and futures placed in the hands of a people who did 
not understand them or where they were coming from.213 It is obviously not practical to 
throw untrained people, distraught with emotion, into the middle of an Incident Command. 
213 “The Gulf Oil Spill: Part 3-The Social Impact,” Youtube Video, posted by “SEPupload,” 30 June, 2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCEP54jSKqU. 
                                                 
  71 
However, it is important to realize that agencies, both for-profit businesses like Exxon and 
BP and government agencies, like the Coast Guard, are only as helpful in the overall 
recovery process as they are able to help the victims try to move forward. 
 The concept of response and recovery must continue to grow as a broad idea, 
addressing the realities, emotions, and social constructs of every group involved. The 
definition of recovery as held by FEMA refers to the “actions taken to return to a normal or 
even safer situation following an emergency…including financial assistance.214” We can 
learn from the Exxon Valdez oil spill that recovery is not only what people can see, but it is 
what people experience. Disasters will always come with heavy emotions and 
miscommunications. But acknowledging this fact, training responders and briefing workers 
before they even step foot on a beach, will if nothing else, garner more community for the 
cleanup efforts. And beyond that as a political motive, public support is important for 
complete recovery. People cannot return to a normal environment if they are still suffering 
and feel slighted by the hands that were supposed to be helping them. Recovery has to be a 
unified effort. It cannot be achieved by overwhelming communities through a lack of 
planning or trampling over tribal governments due to a lack of communication. Effective 
disaster recovery will acknowledge logistical limitations and cultural differences in our 
society, and will plan ahead to cause the least damage possible. 
 
 
214 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Manage U.S.A. (Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 1986), 4. 
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